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McCarty and Levy: Focusing Title VII: The Supreme Court Continues the Battle Agains

FOCUSING TITLE VII: THE SUPREME COURT
CONTINUES THE BATTLE AGAINST
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN
ST MARY'S HONOR CENTER V HICKS
JuLyn M McCarty*
Michael J. Levy*

There are societal as well as personal interests on both sides of this
equation. The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee,
and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured
through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions.
In the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title
VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 ("Title VII') was created
by Congress to address racial discrimination in the workplace. It prohibits
employers from discriminating against any individual on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex or national origin"3 by providing victims
of
intentional discrimination a private right of action against their employ-

* Ms. McCarty is a second year student at Santa Clara University School of Law and a
former judicial extem for the Honorable Robert P. Aguilar, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California.
** J.D., 1994, University of California Hastings College of the Law. Mr. Levy served as law
clerk for the Honorable Robert P. Aguilar, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
California until July of 1996. He is currently an associate with Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati
of Palo Alto, California.
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
3. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
Id.
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ers.4 Since its inception, the courts have been called upon to interpret
and enforce the ideals inherent in Title VII.
6
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court
established the proof framework utilized in Title VII disparate treatment
7
cases by presenting a basic "order and allocation of proof." The
framework consists of three prongs: First, the plaintiff must set forth a
prima facie case of racial discrimination; second, the employer must
respond with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions;
and, third, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's proffered
explanation is merely a "pretext" for discrimination!
The McDonnell Douglas Court noted, however, that
Congress did not intend by Title VII... to guarantee a job to every
person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command
that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of
discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.
Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers
on
to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate
9
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.
In the midst of the heated controversy surrounding affirmative action
and its backlash, it is essential to recognize that there is no question as
to the position the judiciary has taken in regard to Title VII. Although
Title VII prohibits intentional discrimination in the workplace, the Court
will not intrude upon an employer's decisionmaking in the course of its
business. 10 Nor, for that matter, will it institute an affirmative action

4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). Specifically, Title VII prohibits "disparate treatment"
discrimination. Id. Disparate treatment occurs when an employer treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See id.; see also Hicks v.
St. Mary's Honor Cir., 1249 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir.
which
1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Title VII also prohibits "disparate impact" discrimination,
U.S.C.
42
group.
a
specific
to
harm
disproportionate
in
results
policy
neutral
occurs when a facially

§ 2000e-2(k) (1994).
5. Congress also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to
enforce Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-4 (1994).
6. 411. U.S. 792 (1973).
7. Id. at 800-01.
8. Id. at 802-03.
9. Id. at 800-01 (emphasis added) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429
(1971)).
10. See, e.g., Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
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program by requiring the employer to give preferential treatment to racial
minorities.
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 2 the Supreme Court confirmed this position by requiring that a Title VII plaintiff alternatively
prove intentional discrimination."3 The Court held that a Title VII
plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law based solely upon
proof of a prima facie case and a showing that the employer's proffered
reasons are pretextual."4 The Court stated that a permissible inference
may be drawn from such an initial showing, the evidentiary weight of
which shall be determined by the factfinder.5 However, the plaintiff
maintains the burden of proving intentional discrimination, through either
direct or indirect evidence. 6
This article critically analyzes the Hicks decision and its application
to Title VII litigation. In Part I, we discuss the major Supreme Court
cases establishing and refining the proof framework for Title VII
litigation, as well as the split that developed in the circuit courts as a
result of varying applications of this framework. In Part II, we present
the Hicks case: its background, decisions of the lower courts, and a
comprehensive discussion of the Supreme Court's majority and dissenting
opinions. In Part III, we analyze the Hicks decision in light of Rule 301
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the policy considerations inherent
in Title VII, and conclude that the Supreme Court came to the correct
holding in Hicks. We also recognize that there are problematic areas in
Hicks and attempt to resolve them. Finally, in Part IV, we discuss the
application of Hicks to summary judgment, the split of interpretation in
the circuit courts, and argue that Title VII plaintiffs must survive a
motion for summary judgment based on proof of a prima facie case and
a showing of pretext. We conclude that through its decision in Hicks, the
Court upheld evidentiary principles and furthered the purposes of Title
VII by requiring that plaintiffs actually prove intentional discrimination.

11. See id. at 567, 577-78; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994).
12. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
13. See id. at 507, 510-11.
14. See id. at 509-11. The Court has defined such a showing to mean that a Title VII plaintiff
"must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory
decision." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
15. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.

16. See id.
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I. BACKGROUND
The Court has long recognized the importance of establishing a fair
7
and workable proof framework for Title VII cases. Moreover, it has
8
recognized the difficulty inherent in proving intentional discrimination.
Hence, the Court established a proof framework that will allow a Title
VII plaintiff to reach the factfinder upon a minimal showing. In so doing,
the Court has never shifted the ultimate burden of persuasion. Thus, the
Hicks Court held that a Title VII plaintiff must, in fact, prove intentional
discrimination.19
A.

Supreme Court Case Law

20
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

In McDonnellDouglas,the Court unanimously established what has
become the central proof framework for Title VII disparate treatment
jurisprudence. 2 This landmark case set forth "the proper order and
nature of proof" to be used in cases alleging intentional discrimination
pursuant to Title VII
Respondent Green, a black civil rights activist, was employed by the
petitioner, an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer, as a mechanic and lab
technician.2 3 He had been employed by the petitioner between 1956 and
196424 when he was laid off as part of a general work force reduc-

17. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). The Court stated:
The critical issue before us concerns the order and allocation of proof in a private, nonclass action challenging employment discrimination. The language of Title VII makes
plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified
job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.
Id.

18. See, e.g., United States Postal'Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,716 (1983)
("There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes.... The law
often obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person's state of mind.").
19. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
20. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
21. See id. at 793,
22. See id. at 793-94, 800, 802-03, 804-05.
23. See id. at 794.
24. See id. at 794 n.1 (noting that Green had worked for McDonnell Douglas continuously
during that period, with the exception of twenty-one months of military service).
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tion.2 Green charged that the general hiring practices of McDonnell
Douglas, and his discharge in particular, were motivated by racial
animus.26 In protest, Green participated in two events organized by civil
rights groups: a "stall-in," in which Green and others blocked access
roads to the petitioner's facility, and a "lock-in," in which a chain and
padlock were placed on the door of the petitioner's building.27 Soon
after the lock-in, McDonnell Douglas advertised for a qualified mechanic,
the position formerly held by Green.2" Green auplied for re-employment, which was denied due to his involvement in the aforementioned
activities.2 9 Green filed a Title VII complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and then brought an action in
federal court claiming that McDonnell Douglas "had refused to rehire
him because of his race and his persistent involvement in the civil rights
movement."30 He asserted that in so doing, the petitioners violated
sections 703(a)(1) 3 and 704(a)3 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "[i]n order to
clarify the standards governing the disposition of an action challenging
employment discrimination. 3 4 Specifically, the Court sought to set forth
rules to govern "the order and allocation of proof' once a prima facie
case of discrimination is established.35 The Court established a proof
framework consisting of three prongs. First, the Title VII plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proof in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.36 The prima facie case must contain a showing:

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See id. at 794.
See id.
See id. at 794-95. Green's specific involvement in the latter was uncertain. See id.
See id. at 796.
See id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).

32. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
33. See McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 796.

34. Id. at 798. The district court dismissed the racial discrimination claim on the grounds that
the EEOC 1) had made no finding of reasonable cause, and 2) had found that the petitioner had fired
Green for his illegal activities, not for any legitimate civil rights demonstrations. Id. at 797. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that the respondent's demonstrations were not protected
by § 704(a), but held that no prior finding by the EEOC was necessary in order to bring a

§ 703(a)(1) claim in federal court. See id. Thus, the circuit court remanded for trial on the
respondent's § 703(a)(1) claim. In so doing, the court of appeals noted that Green had succeeded in
making out a prima facie case of racial discrimination and should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate that the petitioner's reasons were pretextual. See id. at 798.

35. Id. at 800.
36. See id. at 802.
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(i) that the [plaintiff is a member of a class protected by Title VII]; (ii)
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, ... the employer continued to seek
applicants [among] persons with the plaintiff's qualifications."
3
The Court affirmed that Green had established a prima facie case."
The second prong shifts the burden of production to the defendant
"to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection." 9 The Court found that the petitioner had carried
its burden in stating that Green's participation in the unlawful demonstration was the cause for his rejection.4" The Court also found that in
meeting its burden, McDonnell Douglas had rebutted Green's prima facie
41
case, thereby eliminating any presumption in his favor. The Court
42
stated, however, that "the inquiry must not end here." Once the
employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action,
the plaintiff must have an opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's
proffered reason is merely a pretext.43 The Court stated that "[i]n short,
on retrial the respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons
for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory
decision." Thus, the Court remanded the case to the district court in

37. Id. The McDonnell Douglas Court also noted, however, that "[t]he facts necessarily will
vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from [the]
respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802
n.13.
38. See id.
39. Id. While the Court referred to this second prong as a burden of proof, it also made clear
that it is the Title VII plaintiffwho must "demonstrate by competent evidence that whatever the
stated reasons for his rejection, the decision was in reality racially premised." Id. at 805 n.18.
However, in a prior case, the Court clarified that the employer's buralen is one of production, not
of proof. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981).
40. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803, 807. The Court stated, "Nothing in Title VII
compels an employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful
activity against it." Id.
41. See id. at 803-04, 807.
42. Id. at 804.
43. See id. The Court stated that the following would be relevant to showing pretext: evidence
that white employees involved in similar demonstrations were rehired or retained; facts relating to
the petitioner's treatment of the respondent during his employ; the petitioner's response to legitimate
civil rights activities engaged in by the respondent; the petitioner's "general policy and practice"
regarding employment of minorities; and other relevant statistics. Id. at 804-05.
44. Id. at 805.
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order to give Green a fair opportunity to show that the reason given by
McDonnell Douglas was pretextual.45
2.

46
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine1

In Burdine, the Supreme Court finther defined the defendant's role
in the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Primarily, the
Court clarified that the burden carried by the defendant in a Title VII
47
disparate treatment action is a burden of production, not of proof.
Burdine was a woman hired by the petitioner, Texas Department of
Community Affairs ("TDCA"), as an accounting clerk in its Public
Service Careers ("PSC") Division.4 8 Six months later, she was promoted
to Field Services Coordinator.4 9 When her supervisor subsequently
resigned, Burdine was given additional responsibilities, and she applied
for the position of Project Director.5" "[T]he position remained vacant
for six months," despite the fact that Burdine was instrumental in
retaining funding for PSC from the U.S. Department of Labor."'
Funding, however, was contingent on PSC's retention of a permanent
Project Director and reorganization of the PSC staff.52 The Executive
Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller, hired a male from another division as
Project Director and fired Burdine as part of the reorganization.53 She
was later rehired by another division and paid a salary commensurate
with PSC's Project Director. 4 Burdine sued, charging that the petitioner
violated Title VII's prohibition on gender discrimination in refusing to
promote her and subsequently discharging her.55
The district court found that TDCA had not discriminated against
Burdine in either of its employment decisions.5 6 The court accepted
Fuller's testimony that Burdine and two other employees were terminated

45. See id. at 807. The McDonnellDouglas Court stated that Title VII does not "permit [the
employer] to use [the plaintiff's] conduct as a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by
[Title VII]." Id. at 804.
46. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

47.
48.
49.
50.

See id. at 255-56.
See id. at 250.
See id.
See id.

51. Id.

52. See id.
53. See id. at 250-51.
54. See id. at 251.

55. See id.
56. See id.
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in an effort to increase efficiency.17 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that TDCA did not discriminate against Burdine when it failed to promote her.5 However, the court
of appeals held that TDCA's proffered explanation was insufficient to
rebut Burdine's prima facie case.59 It stated that "the defendant in a
Title VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the
employment action and that the defendant also must prove by objective
evidence that those hired or promoted were better qualified than the
plaintiff."6 The Court concluded that TDCA's explanation did not
satisfy these burdens and remanded the case to award back pay to
Burdine.61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the "burden of proof
borne by the defendant." 62 It held that once the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant bears but one burden:
"the burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its
,,61
In Burdine, the Court reiterated the proof framework it
actions.
originally set forth in McDonnellDouglas: 1) The plaintiff must establish
a prima facie case of discrimination, thereby creating a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the plaintiff;' 2) to rebut the presumption of
discrimination, the defendant must present evidence that its action was
taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; 6 and 3) if the defendant carries its burden of production, the plaintiff's prima facie case is
rebutted, and the factual issues are sufficiently framed to provide the
plaintiff with a fair opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's

57. See id. Specifically, Fuller testified that the three employees, including Burdine, did not
work well together. See id.
58. See id. Apparently, this finding was based on the district court's "implicit evidentiary
finding" that the male who was hired as Project Director was better qualified than the plaintiff. Id.
59. See id. at 251-52.
60. Id. at 252.

61. Seek1.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 260.
64. See id. at 252-54. The Court has also stated that "[the] prima facie case... raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
65. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 254-55. The Court stated that "[t]he explanation provided

must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant." Id. at 255. The Court also noted
that "[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered
reasons." Id. at 254.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/4

8

McCarty and Levy: Focusing Title VII: The Supreme Court Continues the Battle Agains

1996]

Focusing Title VII

reasons are pretextual 6 The Court described the plaintiff's burden at
this point as follows:
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She
may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.6 7
The Court emphasized that the burden of proof required of the
defendant in the second prong is one of production, not of persuasion. 8
It held that the court of appeals "misconstrued" this burden 69 by
requiring the defendant to present evidence that would "persuadethe trier
of fact that the employment action was lawful."7' The Court explained
that the defendant's burden is an intermediate one, serving a procedural
purpose, whereas "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains
at all times with the plaintiff."7'
3.

United States PostalService Board of Governors v. Aikens 72

Following Burdine, the Supreme Court in Aikens continued to
clarify the proof framework for Title VII litigation.73 The Aikens Court
emphasized that the ultimate question in Title VII disparate treatment
cases "'is [whether] the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff. m74

66. See id. at 253, 255-56.
67. Id. at 256.
68. See id. at 257.
69. Id. at 256.
70. Id. at 257. The Court noted that the court of appeals erroneously required the defendants
to prove that the person hired was more qualified than the plaintiff, stating that an employer may
choose equally among qualified applicants. See id. at 258-59. The Court stated that "Title
VII... does not demand that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or women ....Rather, the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided
the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria." Id. at 259.
71. Id. at 253. "The McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves
to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question." Id.
72. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
73. See id. at 714-15.
74. Id. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
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In Aikens, the respondent was a black postal worker employed in the
Washington, D.C. post office, where he had worked since 1937.' s
Aikens filed suit in federal court claiming that he had been denied a

promotion due to his race in violation of Title VI.76 At trial, Aikens
showed that despite his superior qualifications, whites were "consistently
promoted" over him from 1966 to 1974.77 Aikens also introduced
testimony that the individual responsible for the promotions "had made
numerous derogatory comments about blacks in general, and Hicks in
particular.' 78 The Postal Service responded that Aikens was not
promoted because he had turned down several offers for lateral transfers
that the petitioner contended would have broadened Aikens' experi79
ence.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to further clarify the allocation
of proof in Title VII disparate treatment cases. 80 The Aikens Court
reiterated the rule that when a Title VII plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, he "creates a rebuttable 'presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against' him."8 1 However, once the employer responds
with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action,
the presumption is rebutted and "'drops from the case."' 82
The Court held that, following the petitioner's proffered explanation
for its failure to promote Aikens, the district court should have proceeded
to the ultimate factual issue-that is, whether there was intentional
discrimination." Thus, at the close of the evidence, the district court

75. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 712-13.
76. See id. at 712.
77. Id. at 713-14 n.2. Aikens had far more education and training than all but one of the white
employees who were promoted over him. Id. Moreover, he was rated as outstanding, with superior
management abilities and his personnel file contained no negative information. Id. at 713 n.2.
78. Id. at 714 n.2. Although the district court ruled for the Postal Service, the Supreme Court
observed that "[i]f the District Court were to find, on the basis of this evidence, that the Postal
Service did discriminate against Aikens, we do not believe that this would be reversible error." Id.
(emphasis added).
79. See id. at 715.
80. See id. at 713 & n.1.
81. Id. at 714 (quoting Burdine,450 U.S. at 254).
82. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10). The Court addressed
the petitioner's contention that Aikens had not yet made out a prima facie case by stating:
When the defendant fails to persuade the district court to dismiss the action for lack of
a prima facie case, and responds to the plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the
reason for the plaintiff's rejection, the factfinder must then decide whether the rejection
was discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII.
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15.
83. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715. As to the petitioner's claim that Aikens had not established
a prima facie case, the Court stated that "[w]here the defendant has done everything that would be
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should have gone on to determine whether intentional discrimination had
occurred, "just as district courts decide disputed questions of fact in other
civil litigation."'
The Court held that a Title VII plaintiff, as in any lawsuit, can
prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence.8" Therefore, it found
that the district court erred in requiring Aikens "to submit direct evidence
of discriminatory intent."8 6 The Aikens Court reiterated Burdine by
' and may
stating that "'[t]he plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion
88 "'by showing that the
prove his case either directly or indirectly,
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.' In short, the
district court must decide which party's explanation of the employer's
motivation it believes."89 However, the Court stated that although direct
or "'eyewitness' testimony [may not be available] as to the employer's
mental processes ... none of this means that trial courts or reviewing
courts should treat discrimination differently from other ultimate
questions of fact."9
In a separate concurrence, Justices Blackmun and Brennan joined in
the majority opinion by affirming the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework for Title VII cases.9 They concurred with the majority that
a Title VII plaintiff may meet his burden of proving intentional
discrimination either directly or indirectly, by proving "'that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."' 92 However,
they noted that "the McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a
plaintiff prevail when at the third stage of a Title VII trial he demonstrates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the
employer is in fact not the true reason for the employment decision.""

required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really

did so is no longer relevant." Id. Moreover, the Court stated, "[W]e think that by framing the issue
in these terms, [the parties and the court of appeals] have unnecessarily evaded the ultimate question
of discrimination vel non." Id. at 714.

84. Id. at 715-16.
85. See Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).

86. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717.
87. Id. at 716 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).

88.
89.
90.
91.

See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 716.
See id. at 717.

92. Id. at 717-18 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
93. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 718 (emphasis added). In so stating, it appears that Justices Blackmun
and Brennan were advocating a "pretext-only" approach. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying

text.
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Controversy in the Circuit Courts Following McDonnell Douglas
and Its Progeny

In the wake of McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, confusion still
existed in the circuit courts as to exactly how much and what kind of
evidence a Title VII plaintiff needs to meet her burden of persuasion. In
their efforts to apply the McDonnell Douglas-Burdineframework to Title
VII cases, courts became aligned with one of two dichotomous positions,
which have become known as the "pretext-only" and "pretext-plus"
interpretations.9 4
1. The "Pretext-Only" Interpretation
The courts that followed the "pretext-only" approach held that in
order to prove intentional discrimination, the plaintiff need only
demonstrate that the employer's explanation for the contested employment decision was false.95 Thus, if a plaintiff could prove pretext, he
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. These circuits relied on the
Burdine Court's statement that a plaintiff may succeed in discharging his
employer's proffered
burden of proof indirectly, "by showing that the 96
reason is unworthy of credence"-i.e., pretextual.
97
A leading case in the "pretext-only" camp is King v. Palmer,
where the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "Burdine makes it
absolutely clear that a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination and who discredits the defendants' rebuttal
should prevail, even if he or she has offered no direct evidence of
discrimination." 98

94. The term "pretext-plus" originated in a district court decision in Valdez v. Church'sFried
Chicken, 683 F. Supp. 596, 631 (W.D. Tex. 1988) ("Put another way, the legal question at issue is
whether an indirect howing of pretext alone is sufficient for [the] plaintiff to prevail in the third
stage, or whether [the] plaintiff must make a showing of 'pretext-plus."'); see also Catherine J.
Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the PlaintiffLoses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in
Employment DiscriminationCases, 43 HAST. L.J. 57, 65-66 (1991) (coining the phrases "pretextplus" and "pretext-only").

95. See, e.g., Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters; 483 U.S. 567 (1978) (holding that absent any
other explanation, an employer's adverse employment decision is "more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors.").
96. 'Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

97. 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 881.
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While the majority of circuits followed suit,99 two circuits, the
Fifth and the Sixth, did not conform to this position."'0
2.

The "Pretext-Plus" Interpretation

A minority of circuits held conversely, that a mere finding of pretext
was insufficient to award judgment to the plaintiff. These circuits
required a Title VII plaintiff to prove that the defendant's proffered
reasons for its decision were false and that discrimination was the real
motive. Thus, in order for the plaintiff to prevail, these circuits required
an actual finding that the employer intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff.
One example of the "pretext-plus" view is found in Medina-Munoz
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,101 where the First Circuit Court of
Appeals stated, "[W]hen ...the employer has articulated a presumptively legitimate reason for discharging an employee, the latter must
elucidate specific facts which would enable a jury to find that the reason
given was not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the

99. See, e.g., Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1991) ("It is
enough for the plaintiff to show that the articulated reasons were not the true reasons for the
defendant's actions."); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1990) ("The
plaintiff ...must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that reasons articulated by the defendant
for its actions were not the true reasons."); MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059
(8th Cir. 1988) ("As a matter of both common sense and federal law, an employer's submission of
a discredited explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself evidence which may
persuade the finder of fact that such unlawful discrimination actually occurred."); Pitre v. Western
Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[The plaintiff can satisfy her burden] either
'directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer
or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."'); Perez
v. Curcio, 841 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1988) ('[P]retext is established by showing either that a
discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the employer or that the employer's explanation
is unworthy of credence.'); Tye v. Polaris Joint Voc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 319-20
(6th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he plaintiff may indirectly prove intentional discrimination by showing that the
defendants' justifications are untrue and therefore must be a pretext."); Thombrough v. Columbus
& Greenville RR., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[The plaintiff] is not required to prove that
the [defendant] was motivated by bad reasons; he need only persuade the fact-finder [sic] that the
[defendant's] purported good reasons were untrue.").
100. See, e.g., Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that, assuming, arguendo, the employee's own assessment of performance is accurate, direct
evidence of discrimination is still required); Brooks v. Ashtabula County Welfare Dep't, 717 F.2d
263, 267 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the defendant must be given the opportunity to explain the
legitimate reasons for the employment decision, despite the plaintiff's presentation of seemingly
discriminatory facts).
101. 896 F.2d 5 (Ist Cir. 1990).
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employer's real motive: age discrimination.""0 2 A minority of other
circuits have adopted similar views."0 3
II.

ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER V.

HICKS

Due to continued confusion among the circuit courts in applying the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework to Title VII litigation, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hicks."° The case was reviewed
in order to determine whether "rejection of the employer's asserted
reasons for its actions mandates a finding for the plaintiff." 10 5 In a fiveto-four decision," 6 the Court held that proving an employer's explanation was false will not compel a judgment for the plaintiff. 0 7 However,
the dissent countered the majority's argument by claiming that as a result
of the majority ruling, Title VII plaintiffs will suffer unfair hardship.'0 8
A.

Background

1. The Facts
In August of 1978, Melvin Hicks, an African-American male,
began working as a correctional officer at St. Mary's Honor Center ("St.
Mary's"), a halfway house run by the Missouri Department of Correc-

102. Id. at 9.
103. See, eg., Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1417 (4th Cir. 1991) ("'T]he plaintiff must
then prove that the reason given was a mere pretext for discrimination and that age was a more
likely reason for the employment action."); North v. Madison Area Ass'n for Retarded CitizensDevelopmental Ctrs. Corp., 844 F.2d 401, 406 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[The plaintiff] does not meet [his]
burden simply by showing that [the defendant's] stated reasons were pretextual; he must also show
'a causal chain in which race... play[ed] a dispositive role."'); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of
Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[Finding that the defendant did not truly rely on its
proffered reason, without a further finding that the defendant relied instead on race, will not suffice
to establish Title VII liability.").
However, some of these circuits were not unanimous in their adoption of the pretext-plus
position. See, e.g., Monroe v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[The
plaintiff could meet her] burden directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
motivated [the defendant,] or indirectly by showing that the proffered nondiscriminatory explanation
was unworthy of credence.').
104. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
105. Id. at 504.
106. See id. at 503.
107. See id. at 511.
108. See id. at 525.
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tions and Human Resources ("MDCHR").' 0 9 In February of 1980,
Hicks was promoted to the position of shift commander, one of the six
supervisory positions at MDCHR." ° By late 1983, the supervisory staff
at St. Mary's was composed as follows: Arthur Schulte, superintendent;
Vincent Banks, assistant superintendent; Gilbert Greenlee, chief of
custody; Melvin Hicks and Carl MacAvoy, shift commanders; and
Charles Woodard, acting shift commander."' All of the supervisors
were black, with the exception of superintendent Arthur Schulte, who
was white.11 2
An internal investigation by MDCHR" 3 revealed a "poorly
maintained" halfway house, with inadequate security and ineffective rules
and regulations." 4 As a result, some supervisory changes were instituted in 1984"5 in which 1) Schulte was replaced by Steve Long; 6 2)
Greenlee was replaced with John Powell;" 7 and 3) MacAvoy and
Woodard were replaced with Wilson and Hefele, respectively." 8 Hicks'
position as shift commander remained unchanged. 9 Powell, Wilson,
and Hefele were all white.12 0 At trial, Hicks introduced evidence that
in 1984," an
there was a "disproportionate firing of blacks at St. Mary's
2
argument that the district court found unconvincing.' '

109. Id. at 504.
110. See id.
111. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970
F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
112. See Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246 n.l.
113. In 1983, an undercover investigation was conducted by George Lombardi, assistant director
of the Division of Adult Institutions of MDCHR, in response to complaints from inmates, staff,
legislators, and other citizens regarding poor conditions at St. Mary's. See id. at 1246.
114. Id.
115. Following these personnel changes, Lombardi observed "remarkable improvements in the
manner that St. Mary's was run." Id.
116. See id. Following the investigation, Schulte had been instructed by Lombardi to make
improvements. However, Schulte failed to do so, and was subsequently demoted and transferred to
another institution. See id.
117. See id. John Powell became Hicks' immediate supervisor. See id.
118. See id.
119. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 504.
120. See Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246 n.3. Greenlee's position of chief of custody was declined
by a black male prior to the offer of the position to John Powell. See id. at 1246 n.2.
121. Id. at 1252. During 1984, approximately twelve blacks and one white were terminated. See
id.However, during the same year, approximately the same number of blacks were hired. See id. In
January of 1984, St. Mary's had thirty black employees; by December of the same year, twenty-nine
blacks were employed at St. Mary's. See id.
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Hicks' employment record was satisfactory prior to institution of the
supervisory changes. 1' 2 However, in the wake of these changes, several
events occurred which caused Hicks to suffer progressively severe
disciplinary actions.'23
The first event occurred on March 3, 1984, while Hicks was on duty
as shift commander. 2 4 Two transportation officers went to St. Mary's
to pick up inmates. 25 When they arrived, there was no front door
officer or correctional officer present, the lights were out on the first
floor, and the control center officer had improperly left his post to open
the front door.' 26 In response to a report submitted to Powell by one
of the transportation officers, and on the recommendation of a review
board, 27 Hicks was suspended for five days. 2 8 None of the other
officers involved were disciplined. 29
A second event occurred on March 19, 1984, when subordinates of
Hicks apparently failed to log their use of a St. Mary's vehicle.'30
Hicks had permitted use of the vehicle to assist an officer in returning a
borrowed car so he could return to work a double shift.' 3' John Powell
recommended disciplinary action against Hicks. 32 Apparently, Hicks
was disciplined for failure to ensure that use of the vehicle-was logged,
but not for authorization of its use.'33 On April 6, 1984, a disciplinary
review board'3 4 recommended that Hicks be demoted from shift
officers who
commander to correctional officer.'35 The subordinate
13 6
disciplined.
not
were
vehicle
actually used the
During Hicks' shift on March 21, 1984, a brawl ensued between two
inmates in which one was injured and required emergency medical
122. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 505. Hicks' record consistently reflected ratings of competence and
of no disciplinary problems. See Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246.
123. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 505.
124. See Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246.
125. See id.
126. See id. 756 F. Supp. at 1246.
127. The four-person disciplinary review board was composed of two blacks and two whites.
See id.
128. See id. at 1246-47.
129. See id. at 1247. "Powell testified that it [was] his policy to discipline only the shift
commander for violations which occur[red] during his shift." Id.
130. See id. at 1247.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. The four-person disciplinary review board was composed of two blacks and two whites,
one of whom was Powell. See id. at 1247 & n.7.
135. See id. at 1247. Powell voted that Hicks be fired for the violation. See id. at 1247 n.7.
136. See id. at 1247.
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treatment. 37 Although the inmate told Hicks that he had hurt himself
lifting weights, he confessed to a correctional officer that he had been
punched in the chest.1 38 Hicks sent a memo to Powell informing him
of the incident and ordered the correctional officer to submit a report as
well.1 39 Three days later, in a report to Steve Long, Powell "charged
[Iiks] with a failure to investigate the assault."' 40 Subsequently, Hicks
received a41 letter of reprimand for failure to adequately investigate the
incident.'
On April 19, 1984, Hicks attended a meeting with Powell, Long,
42
and Vincent Banks, where he was notified of his demotion. A distressed Hicks was given the rest of the day off per his request.",
Before Hicks left the facility, Powell ordered him to open his locker and
hand over the shift commander's manual. 44 The two argued, and Hicks
left after the exchange. 45 In response to Powell's allegations regarding
"'threats' made to Powell by Hicks, a disciplinary board voted to have
Hicks suspended for three days."4 Despite the board's vote, based on
the severity and number of violations, Long recommended that Hicks be
terminated.' 47 On June 7, 1984, Hicks was fired.'48
Hicks brought suit in federal court alleging that his demotion and
49
,
discharge constituted racial discrimination in violation of Title V.'

137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Id. Powell submitted the report in spite of the fact that Hicks had submitted a memo to him
regarding the incident. Powell stated that "'[a]lthough the medical out count was logged, and a
memorandum was submitted on this matter, NO ACION [sic] was taken by the Shift Commander
in investigating the seriousness of the assault or the after effects [sic] on the residents involved."'

Id.
141. See id. at 1247.
142. See id.
143. See id.

144. See id.
145. See id. During the exchange, Hicks 'indicated that he would 'step outside' with Powell, and
Powell warned [Hicks] that his words could be perceived as a threat." Id.

146. Id. The disciplinary board was composed of four members, at least two of whom were
black. See id.
147. See id. at 1247-48. In addition to the events described above, Hicks' co-workers had
engaged in numerous other rule violations from January, 1984 to June, 1984. See id 1248. Hicks had
reported each of these incidents to his supervisors, but with the exception of an officer who received

a letter of reprimand for negligence in allowing a prisoner to escape, none of the officers involved
was ever disciplined. See id. The officers discussed here were all white. See id.
148. See id.In its opinion, the district court noted that Hicks' position as shift commander was
later filled by a white male. See id. at 1250.

149. See id. at 1245.
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The District Court

The district court began its analysis of Hicks' disparate treatment
claim by reviewing the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas.150
First, the court held that Hicks had established a prima facie case of
racial discrimination by showing 1) that as a black person, he was a
member of a protected class; 2) that he met the job qualifications of a
shift commander;"' 3) that he suffered an adverse employment action
through his demotion and eventual termination; and 4) that following his
demotion, his former position of shift commander had remained open,
and was subsequently filled by a white male."s
Second, the court recognized that St. Mary's had responded with a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment actions taken
against Hicks. 15 3 St. Mary's proffered that its actions were precipitated
by "the severity
and the accumulation of violations committed by [the]
1 4
plaintiff."
Next, the court found that Hicks had proven that the defendants'
explanation for the adverse employment actions was pretextual, in
accordance with the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework. 5 The court cited comparative evidence to support its
finding. For example, it noted that Hicks was the only individual
disciplined as a result of the violations committed by his subordi-

150. See id. at 1249.
151. The plaintiff demonstrated that he had worked as a shift commander for about four years,
with a satisfactory employment record prior to Powell's tenure as his immediate supervisor. See id.
Nevertheless, in her discussion of the actual evidentiary weight to be given to the prima facie case,
one commentator has noted that there was some question as to the standard against which the
determination of satisfactory performance was made. Deborah 0. Malamud, The Last Minuet:
DisparateTreatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2239 n.34 (1995).
152. See Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1250.

153. See id.
154. Id. at 1250. As to the severity of violations, the court noted that the March 3, 1984 incident,
in which Hicks failed to supervise his subordinates adequately, led to a breach in security and was
grounds for disciplinary action. See id. In regard to the number of violations, the court noted that
Hicks had amassed an excessive number of violations in a relatively short period of time, and that
St. Mary's legitimately sought to discipline him. See id.

155. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/4

18

McCarty and Levy: Focusing Title VII: The Supreme Court Continues the Battle Agains
1996]

Focusing Title VII

nates. 6 The subordinate officers themselves were not punished. 5 7
Moreover, the court observed that Powell's policy to punish a shift
for violations committed by subordinates was applied only
commander
58
to Hicks.
Despite the fact that the defendants asserted that their actions against
Hicks were warranted by the severity of the violations, the court found,
on the evidence, that more serious violations committed by the plaintiff's
co-workers went unpunished or were treated with disproportionate
lenience. 59 Such violations included allowing an unescorted inmate
access to the superintendent's office"6 and negligently permitting
access to the main power room.' 6' Even an employee's negligence in
6
allowing an inmate to escape prompted only a letter of reprimand."
The court additionally found that Powell had intentionally provoked the
confrontation with I-Icks in order to facilitate the fight which led to
Hicks' ultimate discharge. 63 The court concluded that Hicks had been
"treated much more harshly than his co-workers who committed equally
severe or more severe violations," and that he had succeeded in proving
pretext.164
The court went on to say, however, that even though Hicks had
sustained his burden of demonstrating pretext, he nevertheless maintained
"the ultimate burden [of proving] that race was the determining factor in

156. See id.
157. See id. Following the March 3, 1984 incident, the absent front door officer, the absent
correctional officer, and the control center officer who improperly left his post all were
not disciplined "in any way." Id. In regard to the incident involving failure to log use of a St. Mary's
vehicle, neither the officers who used the vehicle, nor the control center officer whose duty it was
to maintain the log book, were disciplined "in any way." Id.

158. See id. For example, Sharon Hefele, another shift commander, was not disciplined for
violations committed on several occasions by her subordinates, including doors that were left open

or unguarded. See id.
159. See id. at 1250-51.
at 1251. Officer Ed Ratliff instructed an inmate to climb over a wall in order to
160. See id.
at 1248. Despite this serious breach of
obtain access to the superintendent's locked office. See id.
security, Ratliff was not disciplined, but instead was praised by Powell for "'diffusing [sic] a volatile

situation' by allowing the inmate to obtain a work pass. Id. at 1248 n.10.
161. See id.at 1251. During Hefele's shift, the doors to the main power room were left open,
leaving the electricity and security systems unprotected. See id. at 1250. No one was disciplined for
the violation. See id.
at 1251. See supranote 147 and accompanying text (Doss's negligence in carrying
162. See id.
out orders contributed to an inmate's escape).
163. See id.The court noted with irony that just two weeks earlier, Powell had refused to
discipline an employee for insubordinate behavior toward Hicks. See id. at 1251 n.17.
164. Id. at 1251.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

19

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:177

[the] defendant's decision."' 6 5 Although the court noted that "[i]t is
clear that John Powell had placed [the] plaintiff on the express track to
termination," it emphasized that the ultimate question was whether the
"campaign" against Hicks was racially motivated.'6
The district court concluded that Hicks did not prove that his unfair
treatment was due to racial animus.' 67 The evidence showed that black
1 68
subordinates of Hicks were not disciplined for rules violations.
Moreover, the district court held that the personnel changes at St. Mary's
did not constitute racial discrimination, since the number of black
employees at St. Mary's remained virtually constant. 69 Similarly, the
supervisory changes did not create an inference of discrimination, since
there was a "full-scale removal of employees from supervisory positions."'"7 The court finally noted that the disciplinary review boards
were composed equally of blacks and whites.' 71 Thus, the district court
concluded that "[i]n essence, although [the] plaintiff has proven the
existence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven that the
crusade was racially rather than personally motivated" and entered
judgment in favor of St. Mary's. 72
3.

The Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that once a
plaintiff proves that the employer's proffered explanation for the adverse
employment action is pretextual, the plaintiff must prevail as a matter of
law. 7 3 It found that the district court erred in examining evidence
beyond that which was offered as proof of a prima facie case and

165. Id.

166. Id.
167. See id. at 1252.
168. See id. at 1251-52.
169. See id. The court also noted as unconvincing Hicks' contention that the supervisory changes
in 1984 were precipitated by a 1981 study that warned against blacks having too much power at St.
Mary's. See id. The court concluded that supervisors at St. Mary's were not aware of the study at
the time the personnel changes were instituted. See id.
170. Id. The court stated that the termination and transfer of most of the supervisory staff was
not unusual, given the breadth of problems at St. Mary's. See id. Moreover, the court noted that the
replacement of some black supervisors with white employees also was not unusual, since these
positions had been disproportionately held by blacks prior to the changes. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487,492 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).
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pretext. 74 Specifically, the court of appeals stated that the district court
had improperly considered alternative possibilities for the defendants'
actions beyond those proffered by St. Mary's, pursuant to the second
prong of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework.17 That is, the
district court improperly "assumed" that the defendants' actions were
somehow personally motivated. 17 6
The court reasoned that once a defendant's proffered reasons for an
employment action are discredited, the defendant cannot be in a better
position than if it had offered no explanation at all. 77 The court noted
that the presumption created in favor of the plaintiff who establishes a
prima facie case is rebutted once the employer responds with a nondiscriminatory explanation. 178 However, that presumption is reinstated,
according to the court of appeals, if the employer's proffered reason is
shown to be false.'79 The court attempted to bolster its argument by
stating that if all legitimate reasons for an employment action are
eliminated, it is more likely than not that the employer based its decision
on an impermissible factor. 8 ' Thus, the court of appeals explicitly
adhered to a "pretext-only" approach by holding that a plaintiff meets his
or her ultimate burden of persuasion simply by proving that a defendant's
proffered reasons are pretextual.' 8 ' The court required no additional
proof of discrimination.' Moreover, it found that the district court's
he endured
requirement that the plaintiff prove that the adverse treatment
13
was due to racial animus was "contrary to the law."'
The court of appeals held that the district court had sufficient
evidence before it to compel a judgment for Hicks."8 Moreover, the

174. See id.
175. See id.
176. Id. One commentator has suggested that the district court opinion need not be read in this
way; it is possible that the district court merely thought of personal animus as an alternative theory
that was consistent with the evidence, which thus weakened the inference of discrimination. Deborah
C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: DisparateTreatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2242 n.42

(1995).
177.
178.
179.
180.

See Hicks, 970 F.2d at 492.
See id. at 491.
See id. at 493.
See id. (citing Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).

181. See Hicks, 970 F.2d at 493.

182. See id.
183. Id. It is interesting to note that while the court of appeals criticized the district court for

requiring Hicks to prove affirmatively that his mistreatment was predicated on racial discrimination,
it also acknowledged that the district court allowed for the possibility that the plaintiff could meet
his burden of persuasion either by direct evidence or by inference. See id.
184. See id.
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court of appeals stated that prior cases, including McDonnell Douglas,
Burdine, and Aikens, all "ma[d]e clear that [the] plaintiff may succeed by
proving pretext."' 85 Hence, the court of appeals reversed the district
court's decision and directed judgment for Hicks."8 6
B.

The Majority Opinion

The United States Supreme Court "granted certiorari to determine
whether, in a suit against an employer alleging intentional racial
discrimination.., the trier of fact's rejection of the employer's asserted
reasons for its actions mandates a finding for the plaintiff.""' Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, held that rejection of an employer's
proffered reasonsa88for its action does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as
a matter of law.
1. The McDonnell Douglas-BurdineFramework
Justice Scalia began his opinion by reiterating the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdineframework for the allocation and presentation of proof
in Title VII disparate treatment cases.' 8 9
a.

Prong One: Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case

The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.' 9 0 By
establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff "'creates a presumption that
the employer unlawfully discriminated against [him or her].""' That
is, without more, "a finding of the predicate fact (here, the prima facie
92
case), produces 'a required conclusion' (e.g., discrimination).

185. Id.

186.
187.
188.
189.

See id.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504 (1993).
See id. at 509-11.
See id. at 506-07.

190. See id. at 506. Petitioners conceded that Hicks had made out a prima facie case. See id.
191. Id. at 506 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254
(1981)).
192. Hick , 509 U.S. at 504 (quoting 1 DAVID W. LOuiSELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 67, at 536 (1977)).
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b. Prong Two: Defendant's Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason
To overcome the presumption in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
bears the burden of producing "'a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"'
for the adverse employment action.' 93 "' [T]he defendant must clearly
set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence,' reasons for
its actions which, if believed by the trier offact, would support a finding
that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment
action."'9 4 The Court noted, however, that even though the defendant
has the burden of production at this stage, the burden of persuading the
factfinder that the defendants intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff "'remains at all times with the plaintiff."" 9 5
c.

Prong Three: Plaintiff Retains the Burden of Persuasion

The Court made clear that once the defendant meets its burden of
production by responding to the plaintiff's prima facie case, any
presumption in favor of the plaintiff then "'drops from the case.""9A 96 At
this point, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the true reason for the
adverse employment action was discrimination, and not the reason
proffered by the defendant. 9 7 Thus, the plaintiff "retains that 'ultimate
burden of persuading the [trier of fact] that [he] has been the victim of
intentional discrimination. "'198
2.

The Holding

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision, ruling
in favor of St. Mary's.' 99 The Court held that Hicks was not entitled

193. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254). "If the trier of fact finds that
the elements of the prima facie case are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and the

employer remains silent, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff." O'Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1309 (1996).
194. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 & n.8). Hicks conceded that
St. Mary's sustained its burden of production. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507.
195. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). The Court noted further that
the presumption here operates like all other presumptions and cited Rule 301 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. See infra notes 383-412 and accompanying text.
196. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507 (quoting Burdine,450 U.S. at 255 n.10).
197. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08.

198. Id. at 508 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
199. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 525.
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to judgment as a matter of law upon his demonstration that St. Mary's
proffered reasons for the actions taken against him were pretextual.2 0
a.

The Defendant's Proffered Reason Destroys the Presumption

The Court specifically addressed the court of appeals' argument
concerning the relative position of the plaintiff once the defendant has
presented a lawful explanation for its actions.2"' The court of appeals
asserted that once the defendant's explanation is discredited, it is left in
the same position as if it had offered no explanation at all. 20 2 The
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that regardless of whether the
defendant's proffer is ultimately persuasive, the fact that it has sustained
its burden of production necessarily places it in a better position than if
it had remained silent. 3 Moreover, the Court declared that in determining whether the defendant sustained its burden of production, there
can be no credibility assessment involved 2 a-that is, such a determination "necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage."205
The Court went on to discuss scenarios with variations in productions of proof,20 6 and stated specifically that if the defendant succeeds
in carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework drops out and is no longer relevant. 20 7 Accordingly, the
Court maintained that once the defendant's explanation has been
discredited, to reinstate the presumption in favor of the plaintiff "flies in
the face of our holding in Burdine that to rebut the presumption '[t]he
defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
the proffered reasons."' 20 8 The Court explained that "[t]he presumption,

200. See id. at 509-11.

201.
202.
203.
204.

See id.
at 508-09.
See id.
at 509.
See id.
See id.

205. Id.
206. Id. 509-11 The Court gave three different examples: First, if any rational person would
concede that the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case and the defendant fails to meet its burden of
production, then no issue of fact remains and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
under § 50(a)(1) or § 52(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, if the defendant fails
to meet his burden of production, but reasonable minds could differ as to whether the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case, a question of fact does remain, and the case will proceed to trial. Third,
if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and the defendant succeeds in meeting his burden, the
proof framework drops out, and the inquiry continues. See id.
207. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510.
208. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254).
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having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with
some response, simply drops out of the picture."20 9
Thus, once the defendant has sustained its burden of production,
regardless of its persuasive effect, the trier of fact must proceed to the
ultimate question: whether the defendant intentionally
discriminated
210
against the plaintiff in violation of Title VII.
b. Establishing Pretext Does Not Equal Intentional Discrimination
as a Matter of Law
The Court stated that once the case proceeds to trial, "[t]he
factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity)
may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination. 21'
Thus, the factfinder may infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination from proof that the defendant's proffered reasons are
pretextual.212 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the court of
appeals' contention that a rejection of the defendant's proffered
explanation requires such a finding. 213 Although the Court acknowledged that the plaintiff is not required to produce evidence beyond that
showing pretext, it nonetheless maintained that the plaintiff carries the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the reason for the
adverse employment action was intentional discrimination.2" 4
The Court held that to compel a finding for the plaintiff once a
showing of pretext is made "disregards the fundamental principle of Rule
301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores
our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the
'ultimate burden of persuasion.""' 5 Moreover, the Court stated that it
has no authority to impose Title VII liability upon an employer unless
the factfinder determines that the employer has engaged in unlawful
discriminatory employment practices.2 6 The Court went on to say that

209. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
210. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
211. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added).

212. See id. (citing Burdine, 970 F.2d at 493).
213. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (citing Burdine, 970 F.2d at 493).
214. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
215. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716).
216. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514.
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'
217
although it may "establish certain modes and orders of proof," as it
did in McDonnell Douglas, "nothing in the law would permit us to
substitute[,] for the required finding that the employer's action was the
product of unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser)
finding218that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable."
The majority maintained that the dissent's position amounted to
virtually the same, in that it would award judgment to the plaintiff based
19
solely upon proof that the employer's explanation was pretextual.
This is necessarily so unless the dissent has redefined the prima facie
case. 22 ' That is, in order to award judgment to the plaintiff based on
pretext, the prima facie case would require a standard of proof so high
1
that it would result in a directed verdict for the plaintiff. The
majority stated, however, that according to the McDonnell DouglasBurdine framework, what is required to establish a prima facie case is
"infinitely less" than what would be required for a directed verdict.'

c.

"Settled Precedent

'223

Is Not Disrupted

To the dissent's "alarum" that the majority's holding does not
follow settled precedent,2 24 the majority responded first by stating that
the existence of vastly divergent views among the circuit courts was
precisely the reason it granted review.' Furthermore, the majority
criticized the logical problems in the dissent's "pretext-only" analysis, 26 stating that "[t]he dissent is thus left with a position that has no
support in the statute, no support in the reason of the matter, no support
and support, if
in any holding of this Court (that is not even contended),
227
opinions.q
Court's
this
of
dicta
the
in
only
at all,

217. Id.
218. Id. at 514-15.

219. See id.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See id. at 515.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 512.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 515.

227. Id.
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The majority then "begrudgingly" '

addressed the "dicta" upon

which the dissent relied to support its contention that a plaintiff will
succeed simply by proving pretext." 9
i. Burdine
The majority addressed the statements in Burdine upon which the
dissent relied, noting at the outset that while some of the statements
could be read to favor the dissent's position, all but one of them may
also be read consistently with the majority opinion.23
The first statement at issue referred to the sequence of events
following the defendant's proffer: "'[S]hould the defendant carry this
burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.""" The dissent interpreted this passage to mean that the plaintiff
prevails simply by proving that the defendant's asserted reason is
false.232 The majority, however, contended that an asserted reason
cannot be "'a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the
reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." 233 The
Court stated further that Burdine ' references to "pretext" may reasonably
be understood as "pretext for discrimination. 2 34
The second passage at issue stated that once "the employer has met
its burden of production 'the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of
specificity."'" 5 According to the majority, the dissent interpreted this
statement to mean that the factual inquiry is then reduced to a determination of whether the employer's reason is true or false, and that if it is
false, the plaintiff prevails.236 The majority however, suggested that
"the 'new level of specificity' may ... refer to the fact that the
inquiry"2 37 must proceed from a generalized inquiry (used to establish

228. Id. The majority stated that the Court "think[s] it generally undesirable, where holdings of
the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as though they were
the United States Code." Id.

229. See id. at 515-20.
230. See id. at 515.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515.
Id. (first emphasis omitted).
Id. at 515-16.
Id. at 516 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 516.

237. Id.
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a prima facie case) to an examination of the more "specific proofs and
238
rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced.
In the third statement at issue, Burdine stated that .'[p]lacing this
burden of production on the defendant thus serves... to frame the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full
239 According to the
and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."'
majority, "[t]he dissent [suggests] that the only factual issue remaining
24
'
in the case is whether the employer's reason is false." However, in
keeping with its theory that pretext means "pretext for discrimination,"
the majority asserted that this statement "address[ed] the form rather than
24
the substance of the defendant's production burden." ' In other words,
the employer must "'clearly set forth' its reasons" so that the plaintiff has
42
a "'full and fair' opportunity to rebut them,
Fourth, Burdine stated, "' [The plaintiff] now must have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination."'2 43 The majority argued that the dissent
reads this statement to mean that the ultimate burden of proving
discrimination is replaced by the lesser burden of demonstrating that the
24 According to the
defendant's proffered reasons were pretextual.
majority, however, such an interpretation amounts to "a merger in which
245
the little fish swallows the big one." Instead, the majority read the
passage to mean that proof of pretext assists the plaintiff in sustaining
her ultimate burden of proving that the real reason was intentional
discrimination.246
Finally, the Court considered the following statement in Burdine:
"[The plaintiff] may succeed in this [i.e., in persuading the court that she
has been the victim of intentional discrimination] either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56).
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 516.
Id.
Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 516-17 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).

244. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517.
245. Id.
246. See id.
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explanation is unworthy of credence."' 247 The majority conceded that
there is but one interpretation for this passage: A showing of pretext
alone will compel judgment for the
plaintiff.24 8 The majority, however,
24 9
classified this statement as dictum.
The majority further stated that this dictum "contradicts or renders
inexplicable numerous other statements, both in Burdine itself and in our
later caselaw ....,2.o The Court declared that the Burdine Court
cannot have based its statement on the prior decision in McDonnell
Douglas,25 ' for in McDonnell Douglas, the Court advocated the
opposite: It stated that the plaintiff ought to be given an opportunity to
show that the proffered reasons for his rejection "'were in fact a coverup
for a racially discriminatory decision."'2 52 Furthermore, the majority
contended that the statement at issue contradicts the Burdine holding that
"'[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff."'253 Moreover, the Court pointed out that the statement in
question contradicts Burdine s own reliance "'upon authorities setting
forth the classic law of presumptions' in describing the shifting burdens
of McDonnell Douglas.254
Finally, the Court stated, "In light of these inconsistencies, we think
that the dictum at issue here must be regarded as an inadvertence, to the
extent that it describes disproof of the defendant's reason as a totally
independent, rather than an auxiliary, means of proving unlawful
intent." '55 The Court concluded that the majority's holding conflicts
with only a single sentence in the Burdine opinion, whereas "the
dissent's interpretation causes many portions of the opinion to be
incomprehensible or deceptive. 25 6

247. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256) (alteration in original).
248. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517.
249. See id.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
(1981));
255.
256.

Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973)).
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 518 (quoting Burdine,450 U.S. at 253).
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 518 (citing, inter alia, to 9 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491
see also infra notes 383-412 and accompanying text.
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 518.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:177

ii. Aikens
The majority argued further that any doubt arising from the Court's
57 In
decision in Burdine was clarified by its reasoning in Aikens.
Aikens, the Court stated unequivocally "that 'the ultimate question [is]
discrimination vel non."' 8 The Court further stated that following a
defendant's proffered explanation, the goal of the factfinder is to
determine "not (as the dissent would have it) whether that evidence is
credible, but 'whether the rejection was discriminatory within the
meaning of Title VII."' 2 s9 Thus, once a defendant responds to a
plaintiff's prima facie case by setting forth a lawful explanation for its
actions, the factfinder may proceed to the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination.260
Aikens also quoted the questionable language from Burdine, but then
qualified it by stating that the trier of fact must determine which party's
26
explanation of the employer's action it believes. ' The majority
interpreted this to mean that the factfinder must not only disbelieve the
employer, but it also "must believe the plaintiff's explanation of
intentional discrimination."2' Finally, the Court pointed out that Justice
Blackmun wrote a concurrence "for the sole purpose of saying that he
understood the Court's opinion to be saying what the dissent today
asserts"-that is, that a plaintiff will succeed indirectly simply by
demonstrating pretext. 26' Hence, the majority suggested that its reason2
ing does not depart from what the Court meant to say in Aikens.
d.

The Court's Holding Will Not Produce "Dire Consequences"
for the Plaintiff

The majority then addressed the dissent's contention that Title VII
"'dire practical consequences' as a result of the
plaintiffs will suffer
majority's holding. 26 The majority refuted two arguments presented by

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See id.
Id. (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714).
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15).
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 519-20.
See id. at 520.
Id.
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the dissent: first, that employers will benefit from lying;2 and second,
that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework will be procedurally
impaired. 67
i.

Employers Will Not Reap a Benefit by Lying-

The majority first addressed the dissent's contention that employers
will benefit by lying. 68 Specifically, the dissent charged that the
majority's holding was "adopted 'for the benefit of employers who have
been found to have given false evidence in a court of law' [and who are
hence] exempt[ed] ... from responsibility for [their] lies.' 269 The
majority responded that its ruling "in no way
gives special favor to those
'2 7
employers whose evidence is disbelieved.
The majority began by noting that the dissent incorrectly assumed
that employers must be liars or perjurers if their evidence is disbelieved. Parties commonly take opposite views "regarding the same
physical occurrence."272 It does not necessarily follow that the party
who is disbelieved on the evidence is a perjurer. 3 Moreover, the Court
noted that in Title VII cases, employers must often rely on the statement
of a lower-level employee as to his or her state of mind.274 It would be
"nothing short of absurd," according to the majority, to conclude that an
employee whose testimony is disbelieved is a liar, when his company has
come forward in good faith.275
The majority did acknowledge that there will be defendants, or their
employees, who lie.276 However, the majority noted, according to the
dissent, these perjurers will be "'exempt[ed] ...from responsibility for
their lies"' unless a Title VII judgment is entered against them. 277 Yet,
"Title VII is not a cause of action for perjury," for which, as the majority
pointed out, there are other legal remedies. Moreover, even if the

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See id. at 520-22.
See id. at 522-24.
See id.
at 520.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 520-21.
See id. at 521.
Id.
Id.
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dissent's "judgment-for-lying" were a fair punishment for perjury, the
on
majority noted that it seemed to apply solely to defendants, and only279
action.
employment
adverse
the
for
reason
actual
the
of
the question
Hicks argued that a defendant who proffers an explanation which is
later shown to be false cannot logically be in a better position than if he
had offered no explanation at all."' That is, a lying employer should
not be able to overcome the presumption arising from the plaintiff's
prima facie case. 281 The majority, however, found this argument
unconvincing. It stated that the framework set up by McDonnellDouglas
is procedural, and that there are numerous procedural rules that initially
place the party who responds in a better position than if it had remained
silent.282 For example, a defendant who fails to respond to a complaint
will suffer a default judgment on the plaintiff's motion, which could have
283
been avoided if the defendant had proffered a false answer. Hence,
"perjury may purchase the defendant a chance at the factfinder," although
risks."214
as the majority noted, it is not without "substantial
ii.

The Plaintiff Will Suffer No Unfair Burden

Finally, the majority addressed the dissent's concern that the
plaintiff will be unfairly burdened by having "to refute 'reasons not
articulated by the employer, but discerned in the record by the
factfinder.', 2 85 The dissent contended that the plaintiff "should not be
saddled with the tremendous disadvantage of having to confront[ not the
defined task of proving the employer's stated reasons to be false, but the
amorphous requirement of disproving all possible nondiscriminatory
2 6
reasons that a factfinder might find lurking in the record.""' Thus, the

279. Id.

280.
281.
282.
283.

See id.
See id.
See id.
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a). "A defendant whose answer fails to contest critical
See id;

averments in the complaint will, on motion, suffer a judgment on the pleadings that untruthful
"[A]
denials could have avoided." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521-22 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c)).
defendant who fails to submit affidavits creating a genuine issue of fact in response to a motion for
U.S.
summary judgment will suffer a dismissal that false affidavits could have avoided." Hicks, 509
at 521-22 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
284. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522.
285. Id. (quoting Souter, J., dissenting, at 534). The dissent asserted that the inquiry following
the employer's response to the plaintiff's prima facie case should be limited by the scope of the
employer's proffered explanation. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522.
dissenting, at 534-35).
286. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522 (quoting Souter, J.,
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dissent asserted that the ultimate question should be limited "'by the
scope of the employer's proffered explanation."' 2 87
The majority stated that this procedural objection "mistakes the
basic nature of the McDonnell Douglas [framework]."2 88 While the
dissent implied that the employer's proffered reasons somehow exist
"apart from the record" and are formally pleaded to the trier of fact,289
the majority observed that no formal procedure exists to this end.290
Instead, the employer proffers its explanation "'through the introduction
of admissible evidence."' 291
Moreover, the majority stated that, given the dissent's contention
that the plaintiff must prove only pretext and not discrimination, there is
a "lurking in the record" problem only for the dissent.292 That is,
according to the majority, the dissent contends that it is unfair to require
the plaintiff to disprove all reasons suggested by the record, however
vaguely stated. 293 However, the majority noted that in order to avoid
this, some "device" must exist to determine which parts of the evidence
presented constitute a valid reason which the plaintiff must refute.2 4
The majority declared that there is no such provision in McDonnell
295
Douglas.
Hicks argued that he should automatically prevail once he discredits
the specific reasons proffered by the defendant.296 The majority
responded, however, that Title VII was not meant to punish employers
who fail to persuade the factfinder that their reasons are true.2 97 Rather,
Title VII punishes only employers who have taken the adverse employment action based upon an impermissible factor, such as race.298 The
Hicks Court stated that "[because an] employer's proffered reason is
unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish

287. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522 (quoting Souter, J., dissenting, at 533).
288. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522.
289. Id. (emphasis omitted).

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See hi. at 523.
Id. (quoting Burdine,450 U.S. at 255).
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 523.
See id. at 523.
Id. at 523.
See id. Furthermore, the majority notes that such a determination would have to be made

during the trial, so that the plaintiff would know what evidence to offer. See id.

296. See id.
297. See id. at 523.
298. See id. at 523-24.
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299
that the plaintiff's proffered reason of race is correct." Hence, the
Hicks Court held that only a finding of discrimination will result in a
00
judgment for the plaintiff.

C.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Souter, joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens,
0
wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, " finding that the majority had
expressly departed from "two decades of stable law" in its decision in
Hicks. 2 The dissent was particularly concerned with retaining a
framework for Title VII litigation that would ensure that plaintiffs could
3
succeed without direct evidence of discrimination. The dissent stated
that "the Court abandon[ed the McDonnell Douglas] practical framework
into the
together with its central purpose, which is 'to sharpen the30inquiry
4
discrimination.1'
elusive factual question of intentional
1. The Prima Facie Case: A Proven Case Which Creates a
Mandatory Presumption in Favor of the Plaintiff
Justice Souter embarked upon an analysis of the three prongs of the
35
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework. The dissent recognized that
a Title VII plaintiff must first create an inference30 6of intentional
The dissent
discrimination through proof of a prima facie case.
30 7
stated, however, that the prima facie case is "indeed a proven case.
It pointed out that whereas in other contexts a prima facie case requires
evidence only to raise an issue of fact, in the context of Title VII
litigation, a finding that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case
"means that the plaintiff has actually established the elements of the

is subject
299. Id. at 524. The majority stated that such an inquiry remains for the factfinder and
erroneous"
to appellate review. See id. Hence, the Court remanded the case under the "clearly
standard set forth in § 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 523.
300. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 524 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716).
301. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 525.

302. Id.

framework
303. See id. at 526. Moreover, the dissent noted that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
under
discrimination
age
alleging
cases
in
also
but
cases,
VII
has been instrumental not only in Title
509 U.S. at
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-634. See Hicks,
526.
304. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 525 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8).
305. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 526.
306. See id. at 526-27.
307. Id. at 527.
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prima facie case to the satisfaction of the factfinder by a preponderance
of the evidence."3 '
The dissent supported the majority's interpretation that under
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine, proof of a prima facie case raises an
inference of discrimination and creates a rebuttable presumption which,
if unanswered, must result in a judgment for the plaintiff.30 9 It stated
further that the employer must be allowed to set forth a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.31 0 Indeed, according to the dissent, it would
be manifestly unfair to deprive the employer of an opportunity to respond
to the plaintiff's charges. 31" However, the dissent stated that it would
be "equally unfair... to saddle the victims of discrimination with the
burden of either producing direct evidence of discriminatory intent or
eliminating the entire universe of possible nondiscriminatory reasons for
a personnel decision."3 12 Specifically, the dissent asserted that the
majority had ignored prior precedent by holding that once an employer
proffers an explanation, "the factfinder still may proceed to roam the
record, searching for some nondiscriminatory explanation that the
defendant has not raised and that the plaintiff has had no fair opportunity
to disprove. 313
2.

The Plaintiff Meets His Ultimate Burden of Persuasion by
Demonstrating Pretext

The dissent took the position, as did the court of appeals, that once
the plaintiff responds to the defendant's proffered explanation by
discrediting it, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.314 The
dissent reiterated the Court's statement in Burdine that once the
defendant sets forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the
adverse employment action, the plaintiff has "'the opportunity to
demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden
308. Id. There is obviously an unresolved controversy over exactly what the prima facie case
proves, or what degree of evidence is needed to prove it. As one commentator has noted, the

underlying question in the controversy surrounding Hicks is the significance of the prima facie case.
See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV.
2229, 2253-54 (1995); see also infra notes 447-70 and accompanying text.
309. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528.
310. See id. at 528-29.
311. Seeid. at 528.
312. Id.

313. Id. at 525.
314. See id. at 532-33.
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of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of
intentional discrimination."'3 15 Moreover, the dissent cited the passage-problematic for the majority-which immediately followed, i.e.,
that the plaintiff can succeed "'either directly by persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.""'3 6 The dissent explained further that the
majority has attempted to rewrite this "either ...or" passage to be
"both ...and"; that is, the majority holds that "a reason cannot be
proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that
'
317
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason."
Moreover, the dissent stated that the fact "[t]hat the plaintiff can succeed
simply by showing that 'the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence' indicates that the case has been narrowed to the
31
question whether the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual."
3.

The Factual Inquiry Is Necessarily Limited to the Employer's
Proffered Explanation

As mentioned previously, the dissent was most troubled by the
prospect that in the wake of the Court's decision in Hicks, Title VII
plaintiffs will be unfairly expected to respond to reasons that are not
articulated by the employer, btit are found "lurking in the record" by the
factfinder.319 The dissent presented a thoughtful argument in support
of its contention that any inquiry following the defendant's production
320
should be bound by those reasons presented by the employer. The
dissent relied on language in Burdine that the function of the employer's
proffer is "'to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pre-

315. Id. at 530-31 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). The dissent responded to the majority's
interpretation that the Burdine "merger" should be interpreted to mean that showing pretext assists,
but does not replace, the plaintiff's task of meeting the ultimate burden of proving intentional
discrimination. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 531 n.6. The dissent remained unswayed, citing the sentence
that followed in Burdine (the "either/or" passage) as contradicting the majority's interpretation. Id.
316. Id. at 531 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
317. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 531-32 n.7 (quoting majority opinion at 515) (emphasis reinstated from
majority opinion).
318. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 532.
319. See id. at 534-35.
320. See id.
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Further, the dissent cited Burdine as stating that "'the factual
inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity' once the employer has set
forth its reasons."2 As the respondent initially asserted,323 the dissent
also contended that the opportunity to set forth legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions gives the employer "the right to choose the
scope of the factual issues to be resolved by the factfinder" who thus
should be limited by it.324 Moreover, the dissent pointed out that it
makes no sense to instruct the employer that its reasons "'must be clear
and reasonably specific,' if the factfinder can rely on a reason not clearly
articulated, or on one not articulated at all, to rule in favor of the
employer."3" Finally, the dissent stated that "[tihe Court thus transform[ed] the employer's burden of production from a device used to
provide notice and promote fairness into a misleading and potentially
useless ritual. 326
4. The Court's Holding Is Unfair to Title VII Plaintiffs
The dissent charged that "[t]he Court today decides to abandon the
settled law that sets out this structure for trying disparate treatment Title
VII cases, only to adopt a scheme that will be unfair to plaintiffs,
unworkable in practice, and inexplicable
in forgiving employers who
327
present false evidence in court.

321. Id. at 529 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56). The dissent commented further that "[t]he
majority fails to explain how the plaintiff, under its scheme, will ever have a 'full and fair
opportunity' to demonstrate that reasons not articulated by the employer, but discerned in the record
by the factfinder, are also unworthy of credence." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 534.
322. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 533 (quoting Burdine,450 U.S. at 255).

323. See discussion supra Part II.B for the majority opinion's analysis of the respondent's
argument.
324. Hicks, 509 U.S at 529.

325. Id. The dissent also found that the majority's response, i.e., that the employer's reasons are
not stated "'apart from the record,"' missed the point. Id. at 530 n.3. (quoting majority opinion at
522). Justice Souter stated that he agreed that the employer's reasons are set forth "'through the
introduction of admissible evidence,"' but argued that such reasons are not found "'lurking in the
record."' Id. (quoting majority opinion at 529, 523). This is because "Burdinerequires the employer
to articulate its reasons through testimony or other admissible evidence that is 'clear and reasonably
specific."' Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 258). Moreover, the dissent noted that there was

no confusion in identifying the two reasons set forth by St. Mary's in the instant case. See Hicks,
509 U.S. at 529.
326. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 534.
327. Id. at 533.
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Those Plaintiffs Who Have No Direct Evidence Will Suffer
an Unfair Burden

The dissent stated that "[t]he majority's scheme greatly disfavors
Title VII plaintiffs without the good luck to have direct evidence of
' Thus, although the Court was emphatic in its
discriminatory intent."328
mantra that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving intentional
discrimination, it did not "fac[e] the practical question of how the
329 Only
plaintiff without such direct evidence can meet this burden."
Burdine, according to the dissent, addressed this central question by
allowing the plaintiff to sustain his ultimate burden "'indirectly by
33
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is [pretextual]."'
According to the dissent, such a provision for "indirect proof is crucial
to the success of most Title VII claims, [because] employers who
33
discriminate are not likely to announce their discriminatory motive.""
The dissent asserted that the majority has made it more difficult for Title
VII plaintiffs, because without direct proof, they must disprove each and
3 32
every possible explanation for the employer's action.
b. The Scope of the Court's Holding Is Ambiguous
The dissent also asserted that the majority opinion was unclear, and
case. ' 333
gave "conflicting signals about the scope of its holding in this
Justice Souter cited, on the one hand, the majority's statement that
"although proof of the falsity of the employer's proffered reasons does
not 'compe[l] judgment for the plaintiff,' such evidence, without more,
'will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination."' 3 4 In fact, the dissent noted the Court's decision to
remand the instant case even though Hicks had demonstrated only a
5
prima facie case and a showing of pretext.33 The dissent went on to
point out, on the other hand, that the majority opinion may be read to

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at 534.
Id.
Id. (quoting Burdine,450 U.S. at 256).
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 534.
See id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535.
Id. (quoting majority opinion at 511).
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 535.
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advocate a more extreme position.336 That is, the Court seemed to say
that a showing of a prima facie case and pretext will be insufficient to
award judgment to the plaintiff-hence, a "pretext-plus" approach.337
For instance, the dissent cited the majority's statement that "[i]t is not
'
enough... to disbelieve the employer."338
In response, the dissent stated emphatically that:
[t]his 'pretext-plus' approach would turn Burdine on its head... and
it would result in summary judgment for the employer in the many
cases where the plaintiff has no evidence beyond that required to prove
a prima facie case and to show that the employer's articulated reasons
are unworthy of credence.339
c.

The Majority Favors Employers by Exempting Them
from Lies

The dissent was further disturbed that, regardless of which
interpretation the Court intended to advocate, the majority did not grasp
the significance of an "'unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived"'
explanation proffered by the employer. ° The dissent reiterated its
contention that, in its reading of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, "there
would be no reason in this situation [where pretext is shown] to question
'
Justice Souter continued
[the existence of] discriminatory intent."341
that the inference drawn from proof of the plaintiff's prima facie case is
"merely strengthened" by discrediting the employer's proffered explanation.342 The dissent charged that the majority had "exempt[ed employers] from responsibility for lies" by holding that a showing of pretext
alone does not necessarily mandate a ruling for the plaintiff.343 Howev-

336. See id.
337. See id.
338. Id. (emphasis in majority opinion is omitted in the dissenting opinion). As further evidence,
the dissent pointed to the majority's statement that a Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate "both that
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." Id. (quoting majority opinion at
507-08, 515).
339. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 535-36.
340. Id. at 536 (quoting majority opinion at 524).
341. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 536.
342. Id. This is a contention that the majority certainly conceded. The dissent, however, stated
that this is so because 'common experience' tells us that it is 'more likely than not' that the
employer who lies is simply trying to cover up the illegality alleged by the plaintiff." Id. (quoting
Fumco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
343. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 537.
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er, the main thrust of the dissent's argument is its repetitive contention
that the inquiry should be limited to discrediting the employer's proffered
explanation, and upon such a finding, the plaintiff should prevail."
The dissent stated that while employers may have "shameful," yet
nondiscriminatory, reasons they choose to conceal, this "natural desire to
conceal [human frailty]" does not justify expending with "an orderly
procedure for getting at 'the elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination.",45
In addition, the dissent responded to the majority's argument that
not all employers will be able to discover the reasons for personnel decisions. 3 46 Justice Souter noted that as a result, the defendant must come
forward with a false explanation or he will suffer an adverse judgment.347 The dissent stated that "[tlhe majority's scheme . . . leads to
the perverse result that employers who fail to discover nondiscriminatory
reasons for their own decisions ... not only will benefit from lying, but
action." 348
must lie, to defend successfully against a disparate treatment
Moreover, the dissent was appalled by the observation that by offering
explanation, the employer can rebut the presumption against
a 3false
it. 49 In conclusion, the dissent stated that "[u]nder the majority's
scheme, the employer who is caught in a lie, but succeeds in injecting
into the trial an unarticulated reason for its actions, will win its case and
walk away rewarded for its falsehoods."35
5.

The Majority Holding Frustrates the Legislative Intent in
Enacting Title VII

The dissent also contended that the majority's holding in Hicks is
unfair to Title VII plaintiffs because it frustrates the legislative purpose
in enacting Title VII.351 The dissent contended that "workers like
Melvin Hicks [will] decide not to sue, given the uncertainties they would
face under the majority's scheme. 3 52 Further, Justice Souter believed
344. See id. at 536.
345. Id. at 537 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8).
346. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 538.
347. See id. at 539-40.
348. Id. (citation omitted). Hence, Justice Souter argued that the majority's scheme is unseemly,
in that it places the lying defendant in a better position than the employer who remains silent. See
id. at 540 n.13; see also Justice Scalia's response in discussion infra Part III.B.3.
349. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 540.
350. Id. at n.13.
351. See id. at 537.
352. Id.
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that those employees who proceed in spite of Hicks will waste their time,
money, and efforts.353 In support of this contention, Justice Souter once
again resorted to his argument that it is manifestly unfair to expect
plaintiffs to address "any conceivable explanation for the employer's
actions that might be suggested by the evidence, however unrelated to the

employer's articulated reasons

. . . .,,3

According to Justice Souter,

this would mean that an "employer can win on the possibility of an
unstated reason.' 355 Thus, the dissent declared, "Title VII trials promise
to be tedious affairs. 35 6
Justice Souter stated that "even if, on the contrary, relevant evidence
is still somehow to be limited by reference to the employer's reasons,... the careful plaintiff will have to anticipate all the side issues
357
that might arise even in a more limited evidentiary presentation."
The dissent was concerned that as a result, pretrial discovery would
extensive, thus imparting an unnecessary burden to the
become more
358
plaintiff.
6.

The Majority Ignores Stare Decisis

Finally, Justice Souter stated that "the Court's opinion destroys a
framework carefully crafted in precedents as old as [twenty] years. 3 59
He began by refuting the notion that the cases establishing the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework are composed largely of dicta
which can be ignored.360 The dissent stated that "[c]ases... that set
forth an order of proof necessarily go beyond the minimum necessary to
settle the narrow dispute presented, but evidentiary frameworks set up in
this manner are not for that reason subject to summary dismissal in later
cases as products of mere dicta.",36' The dissent emphasized the Court's

353. See id.
354. Id. at 537.

355. Id. at 538.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. See id.That is, "[tihe majority's scheme ... will promote longer trials and more pretrial
discovery, threatening increased expense and delay in Title VII litigation for both plaintiffs and
defendants, and increased burdens on the judiciary." Id.

359. Id. at 540.
360. See id. Justice Souter contended that this is what the majority did, and that in so doing, it
devalued these cases. See id.
361. Id.
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role in structuring the law "in an orderly and sensible manner" and the
3 62
importance of "not casually abandon[ing] the structures adopted.
The dissent then noted that the majority did not simply dispense
with the prior directives of the Court as being mere dicta; rather, the
dissent acknowledged that the majority attempted to interpret relevant
decisions of the Court, especially Burdine.'63 However, Justice Souter
was incredulous that in doing so, the majority "declare[d the dissent's]
reading of those cases to be 'utter~ly] implausibile]' when the majority
had already acknowledged that the statements at issue may be read to
limit the factual inquiry to the question of pretext, and in a single case,
must be read consistently with the dissent.3" The dissent, in fact,
exhorted that the prior cases, McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, "provide
a clear answer to the question before us....365
The dissent was equally resolute in stating that the majority
incorrectly relied on Aikens to support its holding.3 That is, the
dissent made clear that Aikens affirmed the Court's statement in Burdine
that the plaintiff may succeed "'indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."' 367 Justice Souter
disagreed that the sentence which followed, directing the factfinder to
evaluate "'which party's explanation"' to believe,368 assists the
majority's argument; specifically, the dissent stated that "Aikens flatly
bars the Court's conclusion here that the factfinder can choose a third
never offered by the employer, in ruling against the
explanation,
3 69
plaintiff.
The dissent maintained that "'[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have
special force in the area of statutory interpretation, . . . [where] the
legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what
we have done."' '370 Justice Souter admonished the majority that Con,
gress remains aware of the Court's decisions in this area, and that it "has

362. Id.
363. See id. at 541.
364. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 541. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter also pointed out that his
"unlikely" reading is shared by the Solicitor General, the EEOC, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and over half of the courts of appeals which have addressed this issue. Id.
365. Id.

366. See id.
367. Id. (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716

(1983)).
368. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 542 (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716).
369. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 541.
370. Id.
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taken no action to indicate that [the Court] was mistaken in McDonnell
Douglas or Burdine."371
Applying the Majority's Analysis to the Facts of the Case

7.

The dissent stated that "[t]he enhancement of a Title VII plaintiff's
burden wrought by the Court's opinion is exemplified in this case.' 372
The dissent agreed that Hicks succeeded in establishing a prima facie
case by a preponderance of the evidence,373 that St. Mary's carried its
burden of production by proffering an explanation for it actions,374 and
that Hicks subsequently demonstrated that St. Mary's proffered reasons
were pretextual.375 The dissent asserted, however, that at this point
Hicks was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.37 6
Moreover, the dissent contended that "Hicks was denied any
opportunity, much less a full and fair one, to demonstrate that the
supposedly nondiscriminatory explanation for his demotion and
termination, the personal animosity of his immediate supervisor, was
unworthy of credence." 377 The dissent was incensed that the district
court never made a "finding" that personal animosity was the reason for
the defendants' actions, 37 8 but instead merely "adduced this reason
simply as a possibility in explaining" why Hicks had not carried his
ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination. 3 9 Hence, the
dissent stated, "It is hardly surprising that Hicks failed to prove anything
about this supposed personal crusade, since St. Mary's never articulated
such an explanation for Hicks's discharge, and since the person who
allegedly conducted this crusade denied at trial any personal difficulties
between himself and Hicks. 38 °
The dissent concluded by stating that "many plaintiffs in a like
position will surely lose under the scheme adopted by the Court today,

371. Id. at 541-42.
372. Id. at 542.

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

See id. at 527.
See id. at 529.
See id. at 532-33.
See id. at 533.
Id. at 542.

378. Id. at 542-43. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter also pointed out that the district court

did not even consider that the "personal animosity [itself] may be racially motivated." Id.
379. Id. at 543.
380. Id.
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what this Court
unless they possess both prescience and resources beyond
38'
employ.
to
litigants
VII
Title
has previously required

M.
A.

ANALYZING THE HICKS DECISION

The Majority Was Correct in its Ruling

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, ultimately came to the
correct holding in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. 2 The law of
presumptions, other evidentiary rules, Title VII policy considerations, and
statements in prior decisions of the Court dictated the majority's decision
in this case.
1. Rule 301: The Law of Presumptions
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states, in relevant part:
[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift'to such party the burden of proof in the sense
of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon
the party on whom it was originally cast.83
In considering Rule 301, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated in
its report that "the effect of the [R]ule . . is to make clear that while
evidence of facts giving rise to a presumption shifts the burden of
coming forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, it does
not shift the burden of persuasion . .. ."" Hence, "presumptions ... were given the effect of placing upon the opposing party the
burden of establishing the nonexistence of the presumed fact, once the
party invoking the presumption established the basic facts giving rise to
it., 3 5 Thus, the plaintiff in a Title VII case retains the burden of
persuasion throughout the case, and Rule 301 operates only to create a

381. Id.
382. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
383. FED. R. EVID. 301,
384. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 9 (1974); see 9 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2489, at 300
(1981) (stating that "the risk of nonpersuasion ... never shifts.").
385. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 9 (1974).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/4

44

McCarty and Levy: Focusing Title VII: The Supreme Court Continues the Battle Agains

19961

Focusing Title VII

presumption 316 infavor of the plaintiff until such time as the defendant
proffers an explanation in rebuttal.3 8 Inboth Burdine and Aikens,
the
388
Court stated that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.
The presumption, created by the plaintiff's presentation of basic
information in order to establish the existence of a fact, drops out once
the party against whom the presumption is imposed meets his burden.389 In Title VII litigation, this plays out in the following manner:
Once the complainant comes forward with sufficient proof to establish
a prima facie case, a presumption is created in favor of the plaintiff; this
holds true until the employer rebuts the presumption by offering a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the employment action.39
The Burdine Court made clear that the presumption "drops out" once the
defendant proffers a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.39 '
Once the mandatory presumption in favor of the plaintiff is rebutted
by the defendant, only an inference remains." In enacting Rule 301,
Congress rejected the "bursting bubble" theory,393 and instead adopted

386. Professor Wigmore defines a presumption as follows: "A presumption... is in its
characteristic feature a rule of law laid down by the judge and attaching to one evidentiary fact
certain procedural consequences as to the duty of production of other evidence by the opponent."
WIGMORE, supra note 384, § 2491, at 304 (emphasis omitted).
387. See FED. R. EVID. 301.
388. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 ("The ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.");
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256) ("'The plaintiff retains the burden of
persuasion.").
389. See FED. R. EVID. 301.
390. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 (quoting
McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
391. Burdine,450 U.S. at 255 & n.10.
392. See WIGMORE, supra note 384, § 2491, at 301.
[The presumption] is based, in policy, upon the probative strength, as a matter of
reasoning and inference, of the evidentiary fact; but the presumption is not the fact itself,
nor the inference itself, but the legal consequence attached to it. But the legal
consequence being removed, the inference, as a matter of reasoning, may still remain
Id.
393. The theory of presumptions attributed to Professors Thayer and Wigmore is commonly
referred to as the "bursting bubble" theory, "whereby a presumption vanishes upon the appearance
of any contradicting evidence by the other party ..." H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 7 (1973); see also
21 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 5122, at 564 (3d ed. 1977). According to this theory, a presumption is a matter of procedural
convenience that only operates in the absence of any evidence of the presumed fact. See JAMES B.
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 336 (1898); WIGMORE, supra note 384, § 2491, at
304. Once the opponent introduces sufficient evidence of "the nonexistence of the presumed
fact" to justify a jury finding in his favor, the operation of the presumption ends. WRIGHT &
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"an intermediate position under which a presumption does not vanish
upon the introduction of contradicting evidence, and does not change the
burden of persuasion; instead it is merely deemed sufficient evidence of
the fact presumed, to be considered by the jury or other finder of
fact." '94 That is, an inference of the fact originally presumed remains.
In the context of Title VII litigation, once the defendant responds to the
plaintiff's prima facie case by setting forth lawful reasons for its actions,
the presumption in favor of the plaintiff is replaced by an inference of
discrimination. It is then left to the factfinder to determine the weight of
39
the inference in making the ultimate factual determination.
Thus, the dissent and the court of appeals erroneously contended
that Hicks was entitled to judgment as a matter of law once he demonstrated that St. Mary's explanation was pretextual.396 Although the
dissent acknowledged that upon St. Mary's proffered explanation only an
inference of discrimination was left, it nonetheless maintained that Hicks
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.397 According to the rules
discussed above, however, once the employer sets forth a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, no mandatory presumption in favor of the
plaintiff remains.9 Instead, there is only a permissible inference to be
weighed by the factfinder. 99 Hence, proof of falsity, or pretext in the
context of Title VII, will not compel judgment for the plaintiff. Indeed,
to compel judgment for the plaintiff where the plaintiff has simply
established a prima facie case and proof of falsity would, in effect, shift
the burden to the defendant to prove nondiscrimination. This result is

GRAHAM, supra, § 5122, at 571 ("[T]here is no indication in the record that Congress intended to
adopt the 'bursting bubble' theory of presumptions.").
394. H.R. REP. No. 93-650 at 7 (1973); see also 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 393,
§ 5122, at 571 (stating that Congress took an intermediate position between the Thayer-Wigmore
and Morgan-McCormack theories of presumptions).
395. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (indicating that the
presumption forces the defendant to come forward with some response, and then the factfinder may
find intentional discrimination through evidence of the prima facie case and disbelief of the
defendant's reasons). Indeed, the dissent conceded that only an inference of discrimination was left
once St. Mary's came forth with its explanation. See id. at 529 n.2 (admitting that "everyone agrees"
that the mandatory presumption drops from the case and is not resurrected by establishing the falsity
of the employer's reason).

396. See id. at 532-33.
397. See id. at 536 ("The plaintiff has raised an inference of discrimination (though no longer
a presumption) through proof of his prima facie case ... .
398. See id. at 511.

399. See id.
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unacceptable
in light of the rules of evidence and prior decisions of the
400
Court.
The majority argued that the mandatory judgment position advocated
by the dissent does not follow traditional rules of evidence.0 1 The
majority noted that although the dissent at least left to the plaintiff the
burden of persuading the factfinder that the defendant's proffered reasons
are pretextual, it stated that "it would be beneath contempt for this
Court... to play such word games with the concept of 'leaving the
burden of persuasion upon the plaintiff.,' 4 2 The majority explained:
"By parity of analysis, it could be said that holding a criminal defendant
guilty unless he comes forward with a credible alibi does not shift the
ultimate burden of persuasion, so long as the Government has the burden
of persuading the factfinder that the alibi is not credible.4 0 3
The majority's holding in Hicks is correct because it complies with
"authorities setting forth the classic law of presumptions."4 4 The
majority allows the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination from the
existence of a prima facie case and a showing of pretext, but does not
compel this.405 Thus, the Court concedes that the Title VII plaintiff may
establish the ultimate fact of discrimination through proof of a prima
facie case and a showing that the employer's proffered reasons were
pretextual, i.e., by circumstantial evidence. 4 6 By allowing the
factfinder a permissive inference, the majority's holding remains
consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 4301
and prior case law
07
proof.
of
burdens
and
presumptions
regarding
Finally, by allowing the factfinder to draw a permissive inference,
the majority effectively keeps the burdens of proof and production upon
the proper parties.40 8 Thus, in the arena of Title VII litigation, the
plaintiff will enjoy a mandatory presumption in its favor if the employer
does not come forward with a legitimate reason for its actions; 40 9 the
employer will have an opportunity to explain its actions and thereby
rebut the plaintiff's charge; 410 and the plaintiff maintains the ultimate

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

See id. at 511-12.
See id. at 511.
Id. at 518 n.7.
Id.
Id. at 518.
See id. at 511.

406. See id.
407.
408.
409.
410.

See id. at 511-12.
See FED. R. EviD. 301.
See id. at 509.
See id. at 510 n.3.
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burden of proving that intentional discrimination was the true motive for
the employer's action.41 ' The Court recognized that the Title VII
plaintiff may satisfy his burden of persuasion through the inferences that
412
will arise from the existence of a prima facie case and pretext.
2. Title VII Policy Considerations
Not only was the majority's holding in Hicks correct in light of the
rules of evidence, but it also comported with the policy considerations of
Title VII as laid out by Congress and interpreted by earlier decisions of
the Court.4 13 Title VII was enacted by Congress as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964414 in response to grave concerns that had arisen as
a result of pervasive racial discrimination.4 15 In McDonnell Douglas,
the Court stated that the goal of Title VII "is efficient and trustworthy
workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and
personnel decisions. ' 4 6 Moreover, the Court stated that "[i]n the
implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII
7
tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.' 41 The Aikens
Court also recognized that "the question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult ...[in that t]here will seldom
4 18
be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes.
Nevertheless, in its pursuit to end racial discrimination in the workplace,
the Court has never interpreted the effect of Title VII to be affirmative
action. In fact, in its decision in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,4 19 the Supreme Court held that Title VII "does not impose a duty
to adopt a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of minority employees."' 20 Likewise, in its decision in Burdine, the Court again acknowledged that "Title VII... does not demand that an employer give
preferential treatment to minorities or women." 21 Moreover, the Aikens
Court stated that despite the judiciary's concern over racial discrimination

411. See id. at 511.

412. See id.
413. See id. at 511-12.
414. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
415. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).

416. Id. at 801.
417. Id.
418. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
419. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
420. Id. 577-78.

421. Texas Dep't ofCommunity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 247, 259 (1981) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j) (1994)).
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and its complexities, "none of this means that trial courts or reviewing
courts should treat discrimination differently from other ultimate
questions of fact."'4
What the dissent and the court of appeals have advocated, however,
amounts to affirmative action. In order to compel a judgment for a Title
VII plaintiff based solely upon the plaintiff's presentation of a prima
facie case and a showing of pretext, a policy decision must exist to that
end. That is, since the proof needed to establish a prima facie case is
minimal,4 the inference arising from the presentation of a prima facie
case and pretext may be equally weak or minimal. Based on such a
potentially minimal showing by the plaintiff, a judgment could not be
made without a further evaluation of the evidence, as required by current
4 24 such a
proof structures. Thus, in light of the rules of evidence,
finding could not be required without some other provision of law.
Requiring a mandatory judgment for a Title VII plaintiff who
succeeds in meeting these minimal requirements could be justified as a
function of the policy concerns inherent in Title VII." However, there
has been no act of Congress, nor any interpretation by the Court, to
support such an affirmative action program. As the Court in McDonnell
Douglas made clear:
Congress did not intend by Title VII... to guarantee a job to every
person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command
that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of
discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.
Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers
to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.426
Hence, in light of the legislative intent in creating Title VII, and in
consideration of the prior directives of the judiciary, the majority in
422. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).

423. See infra notes 459-62 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 383-412 and accompanying text.
425. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MicH.
L. REV. 2229, 2262 n.110 (suggesting that the Court could have adopted the dissent's mandatory
judgment position based solely on a prima facie case and pretext, notwithstanding Rule 301, because

a prima facia case and proof of pretext combine to create a "conclusive presumption" based on
policy).
426. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800-01, (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.

424, 430-31 (1971)).
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Hicks came to the correct holding. By permitting, but not compelling, the
factfinder to conclude the existence of intentional discrimination from
proof of a prima facie case and falsity, the Court furthers the purposes
of Title VII: to eradicate discrimination wherever there is an actual
finding of intentional discrimination. The majority fulfilled this task,
however, without making an affirmative action declaration.
3.

Problems with the Majority Opinion

In light of the rules of evidence, policy considerations, and prior
case law, the majority opinion in Hicks was correct in its holding.
However, while we agree with the Court's decision and its underlying
reasoning, there are some problematic areas that warrant attention.
a. The Burdine Passage Cannot Be Ignored
First, the majority asserted that any support for the dissent's position
exists, "if at all, only in the dicta" of the Court's prior decisions.427
While this may be true, it is the majority's classification of the term
"dicta" that is problematic. In addressing the dicta cited by the dissent in
support of its argument, the majority stated that "[it is to [those dicta]
that we now turn-begrudgingly, since we think it generally undesirable,
where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of
the United States Reports as though they were the United States
Code.""28 The dissent responded that cases such as McDonnell
Douglas-whichset forth an order of proof-"go beyond the minimum
necessary to settle the narrow dispute presented .... ,429 However,
"evidentiary frameworks set up in this manner are not for that reason
subject to summary dismissal in later' cases as products of mere
dicta., 430 We agree that "this readiness431to disclaim the Court's considered pronouncements devalues them."
The majority then attempted to explain away some problematic
language in Burdine, specifically, that a Title VII plaintiff "may succeed
[in proving the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination] either directly
by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely

427. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515.

428. Id.
429. Id. at 540 (Souter, J., dissenting).
430. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
431. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 432 While admitting that
many statements in Burdine may be read to support either the majority
or the dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that the "either/or" passage
"contradicts or renders inexplicable numerous other statements, both in
Burdine itself and in our later caselaw .... "' Justice Souter, writing
for the dissent, poses the obvious question: i.e., why the statements in
Burdine should not be read "in harmony with, rather than in contradiction to," each other."
Moreover, while areas of uncertainty and seeming conflict may exist
in the many cases establishing and refining a proof framework for Title
VII litigation, we agree with the dissent that the majority does not
successfully dismiss the import of the problematic passage in Burdine by
classifying it as mere "inadverten[t]" dicta. 435 This is so for two
reasons. First, the manner in which the Burdine Court sets forth this
statement does not suggest that it was inadvertent. The Burdine Court
first stated that the plaintiff must sustain the ultimate burden of proving
intentional discrimination;4 36 then, in the sentence directly following,
the Court explained how this burden may be met: "either" by direct
proof, "or" indirectly by proving that the employer's proffered reasons
are false.437 This statement seems quite intentional. Moreover, it is clear
that the statement is central to the Court's then-understanding of how a
Title VII plaintiff could sustain her burden, and thus should not be
"summarily dismissed."
Second, the Court cannot disregard this statement because it is
quoted directly in its subsequent decision in Aikens. 438 Nor, as the
dissent noted, is the following sentence, that "the district court must
decide which party's explanation ...it believes, '439 dispositive as to
the meaning of the former. While Aikens seems to support the majority's
'440
central thesis that the ultimate question is "discrimination vel non
and the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion,44 it is an inescapable

432. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added); see Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517.
433. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517 (Souter, J., dissenting).

434. Id. at 531 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting).
435. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 518.
436. See Burdine,450 U.S. at 256.

437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id.
See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 716.
See id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
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fact that Aikens repeats, in fact quotes directly, the problematic "either/or" passage. 442
In its two most recent decisions prior to Hicks, the Court stated that
a Title VII plaintiff may prove discrimination indirectly, by proving that
the employer's proffered explanation was false." 3 This hardly supports
the argument that the passage was merely ,an inadvertence. A more
intellectually honest explanation would be made by acknowledging, as
the majority did, that the problematic passage can be read only as
supporting the dissent.4' Then, however, the Court should have
explained that the reasoning behind the passage, included in prior dicta
of the Court, was incorrect. The Court then could have emphasized that
the prior holdings of the Court, and indeed prior dicta, are consistent
with the holding the majority announced in Hicks. Justice Scalia should
have explained the correct reasoning, clarified the rules of evidence, and
stated that Burdine and Aikens were incorrect in indicating otherwise. 445
Unfortunately, the Court merely dismissed the statement as inadvertent
dicta," 6 thereby deflecting a true evaluation of its intended import.
b. The Prima Facie Case: An Underlying Problem
One commentator has suggested that the underlying problem in the
controversy surrounding the Court's decisions leading up to and
including Hicks is the uncertain evidentiary value of the prima facie
case." 7 Moreover, in the wake of Hicks, this commentator suggests that
the whole McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof framework should be

442. See id. at 716.
443. See id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
444. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Professor Malamud argues that there is an
alternative reading that renders the Burdine dictum consistent with the majority. Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: DisparateTreatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2267 n.127
(1995).
445. One commentator goes further, expressing confusion as to why the Court danced around
Burdine and Aikens instead of simply overruling them. See Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and
Ideology: The Wages of Sin is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 994 (1995).
Rather than flatly stating that McDonnell Douglas... and its progeny were wrongly
decided, the Court effectively tells most federal courts, the labor bar, academia, and
Congress that they have flatly misread McDonnellDouglas and... Burdine for the last
twenty years and that the [Hicks] Court's belafed interpretation is the proper one.

Id. (citation omitted).
446. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 518.

447. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: DisparateTreatment After Hicks, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 2229, 2243-66 (1995).
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abandoned."' We agree that the evidentiary value of the prima facie
case warrants attention, but do not agree that the proof framework set
forth by the Court ought to be discarded.
An examination of the Court's decisions prior to Hicks reveals a
lack of clarity as to the evidentiary value of the prima facie case. In
McDonnell Douglas, the Court laid out the criteria a Title VII plaintiff
must establish in making out a prima facie case." 9 However, the Court
noted that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the
specification above of the prima facie proof required... is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.""45
Professor Malamud observes that "McDonnellDouglas created a 'prima
facie case' with a fixed legal consequence in litigation, but the actual
strength of the inferences that can be drawn from the prima facie case
vary depending on the strength of the evidence that supports it."'
Hence, from McDonnell Douglas, the actual effect of the prima facie
case was left unclear.
In Burdine, the Court stated that "[t]he burden of establishing a
prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.' 452 The Court
noted that the purpose of the prima facie case is to "eliminate[-] the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. 4 " The
Burdine Court further stated that McDonnell Douglas should have made
clear that in the context of Title VII jurisprudence, "[t]he phrase 'prima
facie case' ... denote[s] the establishment of a legally mandatory,
rebuttable presumption, [and is not meant] to describe the plaintiff's
burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer
the fact at issue. '
The central question in Aikens, however, revealed that there was
confusion as to the role and meaning of the prima facie case. In Aikens,
the petitioners had responded to Aikens' prima facie case with an
explanation for its employment decision, but argued on appeal that
Aikens had not established a prima facie case.455 The Court declared
that "by framing the issue in these terms, [the petition-

448. See id. at 2236.
449. See McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802; see also infra notes 469,477 and accompanying
text (discussing the elements of the prima facie case).
450. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
451. Malamud, supra note 447, at 2245-46.
452. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.

453. Id. at 254.
454. Id. at 254 n.7.
455. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 n.4.
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ers] .. unnecessarily evaded the ultimate question of discrimination vel
non.' 45 6 The Aikens Court stated that once the employer responds to
the prima facie case by proffering an explanation for its actions, the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework is no longer relevant, and the
inquiry should proceed to the ultimate question of intentional discrimina-.
tion.45 7 The Court's only attempt at clarifying the nature of the prima
facie case was its statement that "[t]he prima facie case method
established in McDonnell Douglas was 'never intended to be rigid,
mechanized, or ritualistic.' Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to
evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the
critical question of discrimination."4 "8
Hence, prior to Hicks, although the Court attempted to establish the
elements and function of the prima facie case in Title VII disparate
treatment actions, it did little to specify its evidentiary significance. 9
In Hicks, the very issue before the Court was whether proof of a prima
facie case, in addition to a showing of pretext, is sufficient to justify a
judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law.4 60 The majority stated that
while the dissent attempted to substitute proof of falsity for the required
finding of intentional discrimination, it could do so only as follows:
[W]hat is required to establish the McDonnellDouglas prima facie case
is a degree of proof so high that it would, in absence of rebuttal,
require a directed verdict for the plaintiff (for in that case proving the
employer's rebuttal noncredible would leave the plaintiff's directedverdict case in place, and compel a judgment in his favor).461
The Court went on to say that "[q]uite obviously, . . . what is
required to establish the McDonnellDouglasprima facie case is infinitely
less than what a directed verdict demands."4' 62

456. Id. at 714. Professor Malamud contends that in so stating, the Court evaded the real
question at issue: determining the adequacy of the prima facie case. Instead, the Court resolved the
question on an alternate ground. See Malamud, supra note 447, at 2249.

457. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15.
458. Id. at 715 (quoting Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
459. Professor Malamud, in light of the cases leading up to Hicks, stated that:
Mhe plaintiff's prima facie case is not a "proven" case that invariably supports a
directed verdict for the plaintiff as an evidentiary matter. The Court has never clearly
articulated what a prima facie case must prove, and its deliberations reinforce the sense
that the minimal prima facie case is inadequate in many, if not most, cases.
Malamud, supra note 447, at 2253-54.
460. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 504.
461.' Id. at 515.

462. Id.
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Professor Malamud observes that whereas in some legal contexts
"the 'prima facie case' consists of evidence sufficient to prove all
required elements of the plaintiff's claim," it is not so with Title VII
jurisprudence.4 63 However, she notes that "the Supreme Court never
succeeded in setting the prima facie case threshold high enough to permit
the proven prima facie case to support a sufficiently strong inference of
discrimination to mandate a judgment for the plaintiff when combined
only with disbelief of the employer's stated justification."4" Malamud
states further that "[t]he minimal McDonnell Douglas-Burdine prima
facie case does no more than identify the plaintiff's case as one in which
'
discrimination might conceivably have been operating."465
Professor
Malamud suggests that the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof framework, with its presumptions and burden shifts, is reduced to an empty
procedural device and should be abandoned altogether.4 She states
that "[a]bandoning McDonnellDouglas-Burdinewould leave courts with
a less structured approach to disparate treatment cases, in which the only
question would be whether the plaintiff has proved intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial. 467
We agree with Professor Malamud that, as defined by the Court,
"the prima facie case's evidentiary weakness undermines any attempt to
draw a strong inference of discrimination from the proven prima facie
case as a matter of law.' 468 The Court in Hicks did little to clarify the
evidentiary impact of the prima facie case other than to emphasize its
flexibility. However, we think it possible to work within the framework
set out by the Supreme Court for Title VII disparate treatment claims by
strengthening the prima facie case.469 Moreover, as Malamud notes, if
the McDonnellDouglas-Burdineframework were to be abandoned, courts
are still likely to attempt to construct some sort of framework for Title

463. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2229, 2233 (1995).
464. Id. at 2236-37.
465. Id. at 2244.

466.
467.
468.
469.

See id. at 2237.
Id. at 2237-38.
Id. at 2245.
By strengthening the prima facie case, we do not mean to say that a Title VII plaintiff must

actually meet his ultimate burden prior to requiring the employer to proffer an explanation for its

actions. Instead, we advocate some intermediate level of proof which would comport with the policy
considerations inherent in Title VII. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

55

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:177

VII litigation.47 As a practical matter, we believe that the current proof
framework is workable.
B. Answering the Criticism of the Hicks Decision
Many commentators have joined the dissent in criticizing the
majority's holding in Hicks as rendering Title VII judgments an elusive
goal for victims of intentional discrimination.4 71 While the practical
effect of the decision may make it more difficult for some plaintiffs to
obtain a judgment, these criticisms are unwarranted.
1. Hicks Follows Stare Decisis
The major criticism set forth by the dissent is that "[t]he Court
472
today decides to abandon the settled law" in its decision in Hicks.
The dissent stated further that the majority's departure from stare decisis
will have a dire effect on the judicial system because "[c]ourts and
litigants rely on this Court to structure lawsuits based on federal statutes
in an orderly and sensible manner, and we should not casually abandon
'
the structures adopted."473
In response to this charge, the majority stated emphatically that
"[o]nly one unfamiliar with our case law will be upset by the dissent's
alarum that we are today setting aside 'settled precedent' [and] 'two
decades of stable la* in this court."" 74 Justice Scalia continued, "Panic
will certainly not break out among the courts of appeals, whose divergent
views concerning the nature of the supposedly 'stable law in this Court'

470. See Malamud, supra note 463, at 2319-24.
471. See, e.g., Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin is Now
Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 956-57 (1995); Donna G. Goldian, Note, New Reason to
Lie: The End of Proving DiscriminatoryIntent by Proving Pretext Only After St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 30 WILLAmETrE L. REV. 699, 721 (1994); Kristen T. Saam, Note, Rewarding
Employer's Lies: Making Intentional Discrimination Under Title VII Harder to Prove, 44 DEPAUL
L. REV. 673, 714 (1995).
472. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 533; see Brookins, supra note 471, at 994 (noting that the Court refused
to overrule McDonnell Douglas and Burdine explicitly; instead the majority stated, in effect, that
everyone else has misinterpreted those decisions for the past twenty years). But see Norma G.
Whitis, Note, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Title VII Shifting Burden Stays Put, 25 LOY.
U. CHI.L.J. 269, 294 (1994) ("Although passages from McDonnellDouglas, when read in isolation,
support Justice Souter's view, Justice Scalia more accurately identified the true holding of
McDonnellDouglas.").
473. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 540.
474. Id. at 512.
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are precisely what prompted us to take this case."475 Justice Scalia
concluded that "[this] divergence [is one] in which the dissent's version
of 'settled precedent' cannot remotely be considered the 'prevailing
' -476
view.
The dissent argued strenuously that the "either/or" passage cited in
Burdine and Aikens supports its contention that once a plaintiff sets forth
a prima facie case and a showing that the employer's proffered reason is
false, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 477 We
agree that the import of this statement must be addressed. That is, we do
not agree that this statement may be summarily dismissed as mere
dicta, 47' as Justice Scalia does in the majority opinion. However, while
we acknowledge that the statement was made intentionally, rather than
inadvertently, we agree with the majority that it should not have been
stated as it was. The statement employs faulty reasoning. In light of the
rules of evidence, considerations of Title VII policy, and the court's prior
statements, the evidence presented by the plaintiff must go to the
factfinder to determine whether the plaintiff was a victim of intentional
discrimination.
Moreover, it is not clear whether the Burdine Court understood the
ramifications of, or for that matter the basis for, making such a statement.
The Court's statements in McDonnell Douglas do not support the notion
that a plaintiff is necessarily entitled to judgment based solely on the
satisfaction of the minimal requirements of a prima facie case and a
showing of pretext. The McDonnell Douglas Court stated that the
plaintiff must be given an opportunity to prove that "the presumptively
valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision. 4 79 It stated further that the Title VII plaintiff

475. Id.
476. Id.
477. See Malamud, supra note 463, at 2268 ("It would be odd if after clearly holding that the
plaintiff carries the burden of proof of intentional discrimination... the Court had meant to provide
in dicta that the plaintiff's proof burden is met.., by something less than proof of intentional
discrimination," since Burdine holds that the plaintiff has the burden of proving intentional
discrimination). But see Brookins, supranote 471, at 969-70 ("The language is there [that proof of

falsity is proof of pretext], and it will not change despite the majority's talismanic incantations about
the shifting situs of the burden of persuasion."); Shannon R. Joseph, Note, Employment
Discrimination:Shoulderingthe Burden ofProofAfter St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 29 WAKE

FOREST L. REv. 963, 987 (1994) ("Through a brutal twisting of Burdine's language, Hicks extracts
a result that alters Burdine's pronouncement that a plaintiff may prove discrimination... 'indirectly
by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.").

478. See supra notes 427-46 and accompanying text.
479. McDonnellDouglas,411 U.S. at 805. Specifically, the McDonnellDouglas Court directed
the respondent to demonstrate on remand that the explanation offered by McDonnell Douglas was
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"must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent
evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in
4 80 These statefact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.
ments support the majority's contention that a Title VII plaintiff must
prove the ultimate fact-that he was the victim of intentional discrimination.
Nor do certain statements in Burdine comport with granting to a
plaintiff judgment as a matter of law. The Burdine Court stated that
"[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff.,4 81 Moreover, Burdine cited classic rules of evidence to
production,
support its holding that the defendant's burden is only one of
82
persuasion.,4
of
burden
the
retains
plaintiff
"[tihe
and that
Finally, in Aikens, Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence
to state explicitly that "this [ultimate] burden is also carried if the
plaintiff shows 'that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.', 483 That Justice Blackmun concurred separately may indicate
that the majority in Aikens was not explicitly stating that a showing of
a prima facie case and pretext always will be sufficient to sustain a
judgment for the plaintiff. This is further supported by Justice
Blackmun's distinction that:
[W]hile the Court is correct that the ultimate determination of factual
liability in discrimination cases should be no different from that in
other types of civil suits, the McDonnellDouglas frame work requires
that a plaintiff prevail when at the third stage of a Title VII trial he
demonstrates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the
not the true reason for the employment deciemployer
sion.484 is in fact
In so stating, Justice Blackmun seemed to indicate that an exception
should be made in the proof requirements for Title VII plaintiffs, and

"in fact pretext." Id. at 804. It suggested that he could do so by showing that other whites engaging
in similar behavior as the respondent were nevertheless treated differently. See id. at 804-05. This
is consistent with the majority's statement in Hicks that the plaintiff must show that the employer's
reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
480. McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 805.
481. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
482. Id. at 255-56.
483. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governers v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 718 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).

484. Id. (citation omitted) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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thus effectively distinguished himself from the ostensibly ambiguous
dicta of the Court.4"'
In regard to the Burdine "either/or" statement, one commentator has
46
even suggested that the meaning of the statement itself is unclear. 1
That is, the Court uses the words "may succeed," rather than "must succeed."48 7 Hence, it is possible to conclude that, depending upon the
strength of the evidence, a plaintiff may not succeed solely on the

minimal proof requirements.
With the exception of the "either/or" statement in Burdine and
Aikens,488 other language in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny is
consistent with the majority's reasoning in Hicks. Moreover, the

majority's decision in Hicks does not contradict any prior holdings of the

Court.489 Nor, prior to Hicks, had the Court addressed the question of
what degree of indirect evidence is needed to entitle a Title VII plaintiff
to judgment as a matter of law.490 Hence, with the question before it,
the majority in Hicks evaluated the rules of evidence, prior decisions and
dicta of the Court, and policy considerations in ruling that a Title VII
plaintiff may not always be entitled to judgment based solely on a
showing of a prima facie case and pretext.
2.

There Is No "Lurking in the Record" Problem

The major focus of the dissent's objection to the majority's holding
is what it terms the "lurking in the record" problem.49 ' Its primary
485. Thus it is possible that the Court was not attempting to make a categorical statement that
proving falsity will always win a case for the Title VII plaintiff.
486. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: DisparateTreatment After Hicks, 93 MIcH.
L. REV. 2229, 2267 n.127 (1995). However, Malamud notes that the phrase 'may succeed' is also
used in regard to cases which include direct proof. Id. She states that "perhaps it is as much of a
stretch to assume an intent to be completely consistent in the use of the term 'may' as it is to
tolerate inconsistency, given the fact that nothing in Burdine as it stood before the Court turned on
the meaning of the word." Id.
487. see Burdine,450 U.S. at 256.
488. See id.; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
489. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514.
490. See id. at 541. Moreover, we find unconvincing the dissent's argument that "McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine provide a clear answer to the question" presented in Hicks. Id. While a single
statement in Burdine may attempt to answer this question, surely McDonnellDouglas does not, and
prior to Hicks no other Supreme Court case addressed it either.
491. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 534-35; see supra notes 319-26 and accompanying text; see also Donna
G. Goldian, Note, New Reason to Lie: The End ofProvingDiscriminatoryIntent by ProvingPretext
Only After St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 30 WILLAMrE L. REv. 699, 715 (1994) ("There can
be no 'sharpening' of the inquiry if the factfinder is asked to search the record to see if the facts can
be shaped into a nondiscriminatory explanation which the defendant did not or could not express.").
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concern is that the Hicks holding went against prior decisions of the
Court. 492 The dissent read these cases to say that once the defendant
has offered a reason to rebut the prima facie case, the factual inquiry
should then be limited to those proffered reasons and evidence presented
by the plaintiff to establish pretext.493 In the instant case, for example,
the dissent asserted that the district court erred in not limiting its 4inquiry
94
to which party it believed, instead creating its own explanation. The
dissent contended that this was manifestly unfair to Hicks because he had
no chance to refute the court's explanation that personal animus was the
495
real reason for the actions taken against him.
As a practical matter, however, the concern expressed by the dissent
is illusory. It fundamentally misunderstood the proof framework created
by McDonnell Douglas and its progeny. In its dogmatic reliance on the
"either/or" passage in Burdine, the dissent's argument is ultimately
reduced to a statement that falsity equals proof of discrimination.
Therefore, in order to obtain a judgment, the plaintiff's sole burden lies
in disproving each and every explanation proffered by the employer.
Thus, if the court found from the evidence that another legitimate
possibility existed to explain the employer's action, an injustice would
result for those plaintiffs who did not have the opportunity to rebut the
explanation.
The dissent misses the point. It is not a question of proving each
and every possible explanation presented by the employer to be false, but
rather, a question of whether the plaintiff has presented enough evidence
for the factfinder to infer the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. Thus, the proper inquiry is not whether the plaintiff has proven
falsity, but whether the plaintiff has proven intentional discrimination.
We submit that this "problem" put forth by the dissent is not real,
but the absurd conclusion of a flawed premise. Nonetheless, in keeping
with the dissent's logic, we may dispose of the argument just as easily.
The dissent's concern that the plaintiff may not have all relevant
But see Malamud, supra note 470, at 2270 (noting that plaintiffs can avoid the "lurking in the
record" problem by using the "apparatus of federal procedural rules-particularly the rules of
pleading and discovery- that exist for the very purpose of narrowing issues for trial."); Richard T.
Seymour, SummaryJudgmentMotionsAfierHicks, C874 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 167,173 (1993) ("A plaintiff
can protect against the danger of having to disprove a panorama of possible 'nondiscriminatory
reasons' 'vaguely suggested' by the record by using all of the tools of issue-narrowing available
under the Rules of Civil Procedure.").
492. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 533-34.

493. See id. at 536.
494. 'See id. at 542-43.
495. See id.
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information at its disposal in order to disprove every possible explanation
the employer could present at trial can easily be remedied by resorting
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.496 There are a number of
liberal discovery rules at the plaintiff's disposal which would allow him
to narrow the issues at trial.497
3.

The Majority Does Not Favor Employers Who Lie

Another criticism of the Hicks decision was prompted by the
dissent's assertion that the Court adopted its holding "for the benefit of
employers who have been found to have given false evidence in a court
of law., 49" The dissent stated that "[t]here is simply no justification for
favoring these employers by exempting them from responsibility for
lies. 499
The majority in Hicks addressed this argument first, by pointing out
that there is "no justification for assuming (as the dissent repeatedly
does) that those employers whose evidence is disbelieved are perjurers
and liars."5 ' It stated further, "To say that the company which in good
faith introduces such testimony, or even the testifying employee himself,
becomes a liar and a perjurer when the testimony is not believed, is
nothing short of absurd." ''
The purpose of Title VII is to eradicate unlawful discrimination in
the workplace.50 2 Punishing employers for not presenting the "real"
reason for their actions accomplishes nothing toward this end. While
evidence showing that the employer has not given the true reason for its
496. See Richard T. Seymour, SummaryJudgmentMotionsAfter Hicks, C874 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 167,
173 (1993) (explaining that the plaintiff can avoid having to disprove every possible explanation
through the issue-narrowing tools contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
497. See id. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (requiring parties to set out the issues in pretrial
conference orders); FED. R. CtV. P. 33 (allowing service of interrogatories upon other party inquiring
as to all legitimate reasons it will assert at trial); FED. R. CIv. P. 34 (allowing production of
documents bearing on these reasons, and their application, or lack thereof, to other employees); FED.
R. CIV. P. 36 (requiring requests for admissions which will pin down all reasons that could be
asserted at trial).
498. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 537.
499. Id.; see Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, andIdeology: The Wages ofSin is Now Exculpation,

28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 939, 986-87 (1995); see also Donna G. Goldian, Note, New Reason to Lie:
The End of ProvingDiscriminatoryIntent by ProvingPretext Only After St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 30 WiLLAMETTE L. REv. 699, 706 (1994); Kristen T. Saam, Note, Rewarding Employer's
Lies: MakingIntentional DiscriminationUnder Title VII Harderto Prove,44 DEPAUL L. REv. 673,

704-05 (1995).
500. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 520.
501. Id. at 520-21.
502. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
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adverse employment action may be an inferential means of showing
intentional discrimination," 3 that evidence is not necessarily dispositive.4
Moreover, as the Majority noted, "Title VII is not a cause of action
''511 If the Court wishes to punish "lying" employers, it may
perjury.
for
resort to other civil remedies under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."° Finally, common sense dictates that an employer who is caught

maliciously lying in court will not fare well with the factfinder, much
less be rewarded.
IV. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS ARISING FROM THE
APPLICATION OF THE HICKS DECISION TO MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Following the Court's holding in Hicks, concern arose that Title VII
plaintiffs would be severely disadvantaged, and furthermore, that the
7
purpose of Congress in enacting Title VII would be frustrated."
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Hicks ruled that Title VII plaintiffs are not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law following a showing of a prima
facie case and pretext. 8 Some commentators predicted that as a result
of the Court's holding in Hicks, Title VII plaintiffs could not survive a
motion for summary judgment0 9 brought by an employer5"0

503. See generally Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
504. See, e.g., Michael J. Lambert, Comment, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The "PretextMaybe"Approach, 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 163, 197 (1994) ("The fact that a defendant's reasons are
found not to be true, or even pure fabrication, does not, as a matter of law, establish that the
defendant intentionally discriminated.").
505. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521.
506. See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 56(g).
507. See Brookins, supra note 499, at 942-43; Goldian, supra note 499, at 716; Sanm, supranote
499, at 673-75.
508. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-11 (1993).
509. Summary judgment tests whether the employee has produced sufficient evidence to create
a triable issue on each factual element of her claim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding that plaintiff's failure to show evidence of an
essential fact merits a grant of summary judgment).
510. See, e.g., Donna G. Goldian, Note, New Reason to Lie: The End of ProvingDiscriminatory
Intent by ProvingPretext Only After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
699, 719 (1994) (arguing that based on Justice Scalia's reasoning, many plaintiffs will not be able
to withstand a motion for summary judgment); Karen W. Kramer, Note, Overcoming Higher
Hurdles: Shifting the Burden of ProofAfter Hicks and Ezold, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 404, 419
(1995) (maintaining that increased burden Hicks places on plaintiffs means that some cases
will be dismissed at summary judgment); Adria S. Zeldin, Survey of Recent UnitedStates Supreme
Court Decisions on Employment DiscriminationLaw, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 921, 932 (1995)
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In fact, the opposite is true. The effect of the Court's decision in
Hicks actually makes it easier for a plaintiff to withstand an employer's
motion for summary judgment."' Although the majority in Hicks
rejected the court of appeals' holding that "rejection of the defendant's
proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff,"5 12 it held that
such a rejection will permit the factfinder "to infer the ultimate fact of
'
intentional discrimination."513
Moreover, the majority affirmed the
court of appeals' contention that upon a showing of pretext, "'[n]o
additional proof of discrimination is required' of the Title VII
plaintiff."4 Hence, by permitting the factfinder to determine the
ultimate question of intentional discrimination, giving what weight it may
to the inferential strength of the plaintiff's evidence, the Hicks Court
adopted a "pretext-maybe" approach which should allow a plaintiff to

withstand a defendant's motion for summary judgment. 15
However, in the wake of the Court's decision in Hicks, the circuit
courts have adopted varying interpretations of its application to summary
judgment. 16 The central controversy that has arisen in the circuit courts

(explaining that courts will more readily grant employers' motions for summary judgment following
Hicks).
511. Likewise, Hicks has also made it easier for a plaintiff to withstand an employer's motion
for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See,
e.g., Bailey v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs., 851 F. Supp. 219, 221 n.3 (D.S.C. 1993)
("Hicks... appears to have changed the focus... from whether the plaintiff can establish that the
defendant's proffered reason is pretextual to simply whether the plaintiff can show evidence
sufficient for the factfinder to conclude that the defendant's adverse employment decision was
wrongfully based on an impermissible factor. .. .'). The legal standard applied to a motion for summary judgment also applies to a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986) ("In essence.... the inquiry under each is the same:
whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether
it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.").
512. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. This phrase was first used by a commentator to describe the holding in Hicks. See Lambert,
supra note 504, at 163 (1994). We use the phrase here to refer to the approach used by the Hicks
majority permitting, but not compelling, the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination from
evidence establishing plaintiff's prima facie case and pretext. As the phrase suggests, this approach
lies between the "pretext-only" and "pretext-plus" positions. See discussion supra Part II.B and note
504.
516. See, e.g., Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441,451 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[Bjecause a jury
may find illegal discrimination upon nothing more than a prima facie case and pretext, such a
showing at the summary judgment stage is sufficient to get the case to the jury."); Collier v. The
Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 1995) ("To avoid summary judgment, [a plaintiff] must either
'present direct evidence that his age ...played a role in the company's decision' or 'create a
genuine issue of [material fact regarding] the sincerity of the proffered reasons for his discharge.");
Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 1995) ("A trier may... generally
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is whether an employer's motion for summary judgment should be
granted where the Title VII plaintiff has demonstrated proof of a prima
7
facie case and the falsity of the employer's proffered explanation.
A.

The "Pretext-Maybe" Application of Hicks

A majority of the circuits have followed the clear language of Hicks
that summary judgment may not be granted in favor of the
ruling
in
518
employer, even upon such a demonstration by the plaintiff. For
5 19
example, in Washington v. Garrett, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, relying on Hicks, reversed the district court's entry of summary
52
judgment in favor of the defendant. The Court reasoned that "[i]f a
plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue regarding the
authenticity of the employer's stated motive, summary judgment is
infer discrimination when it finds that the employer's explanation is unworthy of credence.");
Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("According to Hicks, a plaintiff need only
establish a prima facie case and introduce evidence sufficient to discredit the defendant's proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons; at that point, the factfinder, if so persuaded, may infer discrimination.");
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[A] plaintiff must point to some evidence,
direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's
articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the action" to survive a motion for summary
judgment); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[A]
plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from which the jury may reasonably reject the employer's
explanation.'); Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 385 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that Hicks does not
automatically require a plaintiff to produce more evidence beyond that establishing a prima facie
case and falsity of defendant's reasons to survive an employer's motion for judgment as a matter of
law); Gaworski v. IT1 Comm. Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[I]f (1) the elements
of a prima facie case are present, and (2) there exists sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
reject the defendant's proffered reasons for its actions, then the evidence is sufficient to allow the
jury to determine whether intentional discrimination has occurred."); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[For summary judgment purposes, the plaintiff] must
only 'produce evidence from which a rational factfmder could infer that the company lied' about its
proffered reasons for his dismissal."); Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921 (1lth
Cir. 1994) ("ITihe grant of summary judgment, though appropriate when evidence of discriminatory
intent is totally lacking, is generally unsuitable in Title VII cases in which the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case because of the 'elusive factual question' of intentional discrimination.'); Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993) (explaining that to
survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case and show a genuine dispute ofmaterial fact about the defendant's proffered explanation for the
discharge); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[I]f a plaintiff succeeds in
raising a genuine factual issue regarding the authenticity of the employer's stated motive, summary
judgment is inappropriate, because it is for the trier of fact to decide which story is to be believed.").
517. See cases cited supra note 516.
518. See cases cited supra note 516.
519. 10 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1994).
520. See id. at 1424.
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inappropriate, because it is for the trier of fact to decide which story is
to be believed.""52
B.

The "Pretext-Plus"Application of Hicks

A minority of the circuit courts, however, have erroneously
interpreted Hicks as adopting a "pretext-plus" approach." z These courts
have ruled that a Title VII plaintiff's prima facie case and showing of
pretext may be insufficient to allow the factfinder to make a reasonable
inference of discrimination, and thus have awarded summary judgment
to the employer.5 2
For instance, in Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools,524 an en banc
panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the notion that the
inference arising from a prima facie case and a showing of falsity of
pretext is always sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. 5 The court held, that upon a motion for summary judgment, the
district court must evaluate the plaintiff's evidence to determine its
sufficiency, that is, whether a factfinder could reasonably infer intentional
discrimination.5 26 Thus, to withstand a motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff must offer evidence which creates both an issue of fact as

521. Id. at 1433.
522. See, e.g., Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1995) ("While the plaintiff may rely on
the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination, the evidence must be sufficient for a
reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer's decision was motivated by discriminatory
animus."); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 263 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the
evidence presented by the plaintiff must be sufficient to create "'a genuine issue of fact on the
question of whether the employer's asserted explanation' for discharging the plaintiff is pretextual
or is consistent with the plaintiff's allegation of race, age, and disability discrimination); Nelson v.
Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[The plaintiff] must do more than
simply discredit an employer's nondiscriminatory explanation; he must also present evidence capable
of proving that the real reason for his termination was discrimination based on age."); Bodenheimer
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 959 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that Hicks requires the plaintiff to
do more than simply negate the employer's defense to survive summaryjudgment. The plaintiff must
provide evidence "that would prove that, more likely than not, the employer fired [the plaintiff]
because of his age."); LeBlanc v. Great Arm. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 843 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining
that to get the case to the factfinder, the plaintiff must show evidence that would allow "the
factfinder reasonably to conclude that the employer's decision to discharge him or her was
wrongfully based on age.").
523. See id.; see also infra note 524 and accompanying text.
524. 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996) (en bane).
525. See id. at 994.
526. See id.
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to the employer's stated reason and a reasonable inference that discrimi27
nation was the determining factor.
A minority of the circuit courts have thus awarded summary
judgment to employers despite the plaintiff's showing of a prima facie
case and pretext. 2 8 These courts have erroneously attempted to judge
the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence, rather than allowing the
factfinder to determine the inferential strength of the plaintiff's case.
According to the classic rules of evidence and Rule 301, once the
employer rebuts the presumption created by the plaintiff in establishing
a prima facie case, the presumption drops and an inference of discrimination remains. 29 This inference is strengthened if the plaintiff proves
3
that the employer's explanation is false. Therefore, once the plaintiff
has made this initial showing, he has created a triable issue of fact and
the ultimate question of intentional discrimination must be determined by
the factfinder" 3
The interpretation adopted by the majority of the circuits is also
consistent with the framework of proof the Supreme Court developed for
Title VII litigation in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny: The Title VII
plaintiff establishes a rebuttable presumption by setting forth a prima
facie case; this presumption then drops out if the employer comes forth
with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions, leaving
only an inference of discrimination; this inference is strengthened by
evidence presented by the plaintiff to show that the employer's reason is
false. 32 Similarly, in Hicks, the Court stated that "[tihe factfinder's
disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if
disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with
the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination."5'33 The Hicks Court made clear that it is for the trier of
fact to determine the strength of any inference in favor of the plaintiff,
case and
and thus held that once a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie534
made.
be
may
falsity, a permissive inference of discrimination

527. See id.
528. See, e.g., supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
for a discussion
529. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; see also notes 383-412 and accompanying text
of Rule 301.
530. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
531. See id.
711,716 (1983);
532. See, e.g., Unites States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governers v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
(1981).
256
248,
U.S.
450
Burdine,
v.
Affairs
Texas Dep't of Community
533. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
534. See id.
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A minority of circuits, including the Rhodes court, misinterpret the
import of the Hicks holding. The logical consequence of the approach
taken by these circuits is that in some cases, no inference may arise from
a showing of a prima facie case and falsity of the employer.'s reasons.
Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment, these courts require
Title VII plaintiffs to convince the court that a reasonable inference may
be drawn from their proof requirements. 5 In so requiring, these courts
ignore Hicks, the rules of evidence, and common sense. Moreover, such
a determination by the court is unnecessary. It is the factfinder who
should bear the responsibility of weighing the evidence and determining
if the inference created by the plaintiff's prima facie case and showing
of pretext is strong enough to reach the ultimate conclusion of intentional
discrimination.
Thus, in Hicks the Supreme Court has set forth a "pretext-maybe"
approach: "[R]ejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.s 6 As we have stated in this paper, the effect of this decision has
been a permissive inference (not a mandatory one, as the dissent and a
minority of circuits would hold) for plaintiffs who have met basic proof
requirements. Further, as we have shown, the Hicks decision is supported
in prior case law and the classic rules of evidence. 7
As to the dissent's contention that the majority effectively has
advocated a "'pretext-plus' approach,38 this is not supported by a
careful reading of the opinion. In the Court's own words:
there is nothing whatever inconsistent between this statement [allowing
a permissive inference of discrimination] and our later statements that
1) the plaintiff must show both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason, and 2) a "it is not enough... to
disbelieve the employer." Even though (as we say here) rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of
discrimination, there must be a finding of discrimination." '
By allowing a permissive inference, the majority allows the
factfinder to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination by using
535. See, e.g., supra notes 522-31 and accompanying text.
536. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (emphasis omitted).

537. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983);
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 460 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); FED. R. EVID. 301.
538. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 535.
539. Id. at 511 nA (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
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falsity as an "auxiliary," but not, as the dissent would advocate, as an
5 40
independent means of establishing that fact.
In the arena of summary judgment, the "pretext-maybe" approach
allows the factfinder to determine the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination. The dissent was mistaken in its prediction that the
holding of Hicks "would result in summary judgment for the employer
in the many cases where the plaintiff has no evidence beyond that
that the employer's
required to prove a prima facie case and to show
54
articulated reasons are unworthy of credence."
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we believe that in light of the rules of evidence and
the policy considerations inherent in Title VII, the Supreme Court's
decision in Hicks is correct. By allowing a permissive inference, the
Court has permitted the Title VII plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination indirectly, through a prima facie case and a showing of pretext.
By not requiring judgment for the plaintiff based on such a showing,
however, the Court effectively left the burden of persuasion upon the
plaintiff, in accordance with the classic rules of evidence and Rule 301.
Moreover, the Court refused to make a substantive alteration to existing
law to support the dissent's solution of tacit affirmative action. Instead,
in considering evidentiary principles and the concerns of Congress in
enacting Title VII, the Court redefined the proof framework to allow the
Title VII plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment and reach
the factfinder.

540. Id. at 518.
541. Id. at 535-36.
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